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ILLUMINATING SECRECY: A NEW ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
Scott A. Moss*
Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settle-
ment forbidding the parties from disclosing their allegations, evidence, or
settlement amount. Confidentiality draws fierce criticism for harming third
parties by concealing serious misdeeds like discrimination, pollution, defec-
tive manufacturing, and sexual abuse. Others defend confidentiality as a
mutually beneficial pay-for-silence bargain that facilitates settlement, serves
judicial economy, and prevents frivolous copycat lawsuits. This debate is
based in economic logic, yet most analyses have been surprisingly shallow
as to how confidentiality affects incentives to settle. Depicting a more nu-
anced, complex reality of litigation and settlement, this Article reaches
several conclusions that are quite different from the economic conventional
wisdom-and absent from the existing literature. First, contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom that banning confidentiality would inhibit settlement, a
ban could promote early settlements. No ban could effectively cover settle-
ments reached before litigation, so any ban would incentivize parties to settle
confidentially prefiling-and such early settlements save more litigation
costs. Second, a ban would affect high- and low-value cases differently, de-
pending on whether publicity-conscious defendants worry more about one
big settlement or several small ones. Third, more settlement data would de-
crease litigation uncertainty, helping parties settle and deterring frivolous
lawsuits. Fourth, more data would also reveal unlawful practices, yielding
more efficient decisions by consumers, workers, and investors who otherwise
engage in over-avoidance when unable to distinguish hazardous from safe
goods. Contrary to the traditional economic story, we cannot predict the net
effect of all these competing effects. Economics thus does not counsel against
a confidentiality ban. This analysis typifies the schism between traditional
economic analyses, which reach definite conclusions by simplifying complex
realities, and many contemporary economic analyses, which are realistically
nuanced but do not yield categorical conclusions. The latter brand of eco-
nomics is sounder and still can clarify important matters such as parties'
incentives, rules' costs and benefits, and the tradeoffs and competing effects
of a policy like a confidentiality ban.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. The author wishes to
thank Professors Peter Huang, Matthew Bodie, Amanda Frost, Patricia Bradford, Michael
O'Hear, Shirley Wiegand, and Nantiya Ruan for reviewing this Article and offering many helpful
suggestions and edits. For their feedback on presentations of this Article, I thank the faculty
participating in the 2006 Colloquium on Labor & Employment Law, the Midwest Law & Eco-
nomics Association Annual Meeting, the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop Series, the Marquette
Law Faculty Workshop Series, and the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop Series. Finally, I
thank the students in my fall 2006 Marquette Law & Economics class and my excellent research
assistants, Amy Klockenga and Eric Lengell, for their work on this Article, especially their ex-
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INTRODUCTION: A CONFIDENTIALITY CONTROVERSY
IN NEED OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Lawsuits are tales that begin with great fanfare and suspense, with fire-
and-brimstone pleadings telling dueling stories of injustice and lies, fol-
lowed by contentious pretrial battles. Yet most lawsuits are tales that end
abruptly, with a whimper of a one-page "voluntary dismissal" that ends the
dispute without explanation, making it appear "that the plaintiff simply gave
up."' "[S]ettlement terms are usually not reflected in court documents,' 2 in-
stead appearing only in settlement documents broadly forbidding the parties
from discussing their allegations, evidence, or settlement amount.3 Public
settlements are the exception, common in only a few types of cases such as
class actions4 and some cases with governmental defendants5 or plaintiffs.6
Courts regularly allow confidentiality provisions; indeed, under existing
law, they cannot force parties to disclose settlement terms they had agreed
to keep confidential! A few jurisdictions restrict confidentiality8 in the small
I. Minna Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 929
(2006). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) provides the preferred way for parties to dismiss a
case voluntarily, by filing a simple dismissal stipulation.
2. Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607 (E.D. Va. 1999).
3. E.g., Confidential Settlement Agreement and General Release 9 (template, on file with
author) ("[Tihis Agreement, as well as the nature and terms of this settlement and the subject matter
thereof, will be forever ... confidential .... The parties] shall make no disclosure or reference to
the terms of this Agreement to any person."). It is hard to cite an actual confidential settlement,
because they are secret; this form is typical and at least two major law firms were using it.
4. Class action settlements must be disclosed to class members and scrutinized by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). See, e.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, 181 ER.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting
settlement proposed by the parties but opposed by some class members and amicus curiae).
5. In some states, "public entit[ies] cannot enter into ... confidentiality" agreements "with
respect to public records." State ex rel. Sun Newspapers v. Westlake Bd. Of Educ., 601 N.E.2d 173,
175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State ex rel. Allright Parking of Cleveland, Inc. v. City of Cleve-
land, No. 57881, 1991 WL 30252, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1991)). For an example of such a
settlement, see Sherry v. N.Y. Med. Coll., No. 99-CV-2310, 2000 WL 781867 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
2000) (ordering the defendant city to pay the plaintiff $129,975.20).
6. Kotkin, supra note I, at 927 (noting an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
practice of requiring settlements to be filed publicly in court). For an example of such a settlement,
see EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01-CV-8421, 2004 WL 1584938 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2004)
(sex discrimination consent decree with terms including "Total Settlement Amount of $54 million").
7. Courts cannot force parties to disclose their settlement terms. Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 41 "does not ... empower ... court[s] to attach conditions to the parties' stipulation of
dismissal," Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994), and district
courts that try to force disclosure of confidential settlement terms are always reversed, see, e.g.,
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[lit was a serious abuse of dis-
cretion for the district court to refer to the magnitude of the settlement amount-theretofore
confidential ... "); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[Uinder [Rule 41,] the
stipulation of dismissal divested the district court of any jurisdiction it might have had to order the
settlement agreement made public.").
8. E.g., DIsT. S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.03(E) ("No settlement agreement filed with the Court
shall be sealed .... "); see ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 2-3 (2004) (collecting court rules, no others of which ban sealing).
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number of confidential settlements filed in court under seal,9 but none
broadly ban settlement confidentiality,' ° and proposals for broader restric-
tions have not yet succeeded." Most courts accept this state of affairs not
reluctantly but eagerly, disclaiming any power over settlement 2 and praising
"'[s]ecrecy of settlement terms ... [as] a well-established American litiga-
tion practice.. ,,.
With so many lawsuits beginning with allegations of grievous social
harm but ending with the legal equivalent of "never mind," confidential set-
tlements have drawn increasingly fierce criticism recently, attacked as ways
defendants conceal serious misdeeds such as dissemination of hazardous
products, 4 discrimination, 5 pollution, 6 or sexual abuse."' These critiques
9. Confidential settlements are filed in under 0.5% of federal cases. REAGAN ET AL., supra
note 8, at 1.
10. Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act and Louisiana's virtually identical rule are the two
broadest of the few state laws restricting private confidentiality. See Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable
South Carolina Court Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REv. 883, 891-95 (2004) (collecting
state laws). However, even Florida's law covers only settlements "concealing ... information con-
cerning a public hazard" and "that has caused and is likely to cause injury," FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 69.081(2), (4) (West 2004), and this language limits the law to (1) only hazards that have already
caused and are still likely to cause injuries and (2) only "health and safety" hazards, not harms like
financial fraud, see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 830 So. 2d 886, 887-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
11. Zitrin, supra note 10, at 895 (recounting failure of federal proposals).
12. E.g., United States v. Altman, 750 F.2d 684, 696 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Courts not only frown
on interference by trial judges in parties' settlement negotiations, but also renounce the practice of
approving parties' settlement agreements"); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330
(5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the parties are free to settle if they can agree to terms, while the
judge's role is to resolve issues brought to him and to stay indifferent when the parties settle).
13. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985)).
14. E.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2650 (1995) (noting that defective products that were allegedly hidden include "Dow Coming's
silicone gel breast implants; pickup trucks made by Ford and General Motors; Upjohn's sleeping pill
Halcion ... and McNeil Pharmaceutical's painkiller, Zomax."). Laurie Kratky Dord recounts simi-
larly:
The recall of over fourteen million potentially dangerous tires ... came eight years after...
lawsuits concerning a tire ... linked to over two hundred and fifty deaths .... Many of those
Firestone cases were kept secret .... GM's side-mounted gas tanks, the Dalkon shield, the
Shiley heart valve, and ... environmental hazards flew[ ] below public radar cloaked by ...
settlements.
Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's New Rules
Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 792 (2004)
15. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 1, at 930 ("The whole thrust of equal employment legisla-
tion was that.., discrimination would be brought to public attention... ").
16. See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Informational Externalities in
Settlement Bargaining; Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587, 587-
589 (2002) (recounting later-disclosed sealed settlement in toxic tort case alleging gasoline leaks
into a community's drinking water).
17. Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unin-
tended Consequences, 54 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2006) (manuscript at 1, on file with
author) (recounting settled and sealed child sex abuse cases involving priests years before clergy
child abuse was widely known).
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build upon the broader view "Against Settlement" (the title of the famous
article) that settlement sacrifices many virtues of our justice system on the
altar of convenience.1S
Defenders of confidential settlements offer a range of arguments. From
the free-market right-to-contract perspective, confidentiality facilitates mu-
tually beneficial settlement deals: defendants value and pay for
confidentiality; plaintiffs gladly accept money for their silence.' 9 From the
judicial economy perspective, judges candidly admit supporting any pro-
settlement practice that lightens their dockets, 20 and disclosing settlements
could spur more lawsuits by making defendants look like easy targets.
2
1
From the legal ethics perspective, parties hire lawyers to resolve their dis-
putes on the best terms, not to serve a broader social good by rejecting
advantageous money-for-silence offers."
On all sides of the debate, however, the economic logic has been surpris-
ingly shallow as to how confidentiality affects parties' settlement
incentives." The pro-confidentiality economic analysis is just that bad pub-licity is a non-monetary cost defendants pay to avoid and that settlements
18. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) ("I do not believe
that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment .... [It is] a highly problematic tech-
nique for streamlining dockets .... Consent is often coerced ... justice may not be done ....
[Slettlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised.").
19. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
20. "1 would sign an order that stipulated that the moon was made out of cheese if the law-
yers ... asked" in a settlement, one judge colorfully admitted. Joseph F. Anderson, Hidden from the
Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV.
71 1, 729-30 (2004) (quoting another judge: "If I did not go along, [settlement] ... would fall apart
... [yielding] a six-month trial."); see also Arthur R. Miller, Jr., Confidentiality, Protective Orders,
and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 486 (1991) (arguing against requiring
settlement disclosure because "[clonfidentialities ... are bargained-for elements of settlement
agreements .... [There is a] strong public interest in ... promoting settlement .... [which] helps
free valuable judicial resources .... [The] justice system could not bear the increased burden ...
[of] reducing the frequency of settlement or delaying" it.).
21. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
22. See Luban, supra note 14, at 2624-25 (noting the legal ethics view that attorneys must
"maximize a client's outcome" regardless of effects on others). Compare Heather Waldbeser &
Heather DeGrave, Current Development, A Plaintiffs Lawyer's Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a
Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 826 (2003) ("[Z]ealous representation ....
[requires] attorney[s] ... [to] enter into a confidential settlement agreement if it best serves the
client [ ]... "), with Zitrin, supra note 10 (arguing, based on legal ethics, against settlements limit-
ing information about public harms).
23. The only serious economic study of confidential settlements is a series of three excellent
articles co-authored by two economists, Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, all three of
which focus on matters much more limited than this Article. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.
Reinganum Hush money, 30 RAND J. EcON. 661 (1999) (demonstrating through modeling that,
under most circumstances, parties have incentives to keep settlements confidential, to the potential
detriment of third parties, and discussing whether, on average, confidentiality makes settling parties
better or worse off) [hereinafter Daughety & Reinganum, Hush money]; Daughety & Reinganum,
supra note 16 (addressing the same issues as the authors' 1999 article but varying certain assump-
tions); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety, 95 AMER. EcON. REV.
1074 (2005) (noting how confidentiality lets manufacturers avoid remedying product defects, poten-
tially decreasing consumer demand, and how "good" manufacturers might support a confidentiality
ban) [hereinafter Daughety & Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety].
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decrease litigation costs. The anti-confidentiality view usually is cast in
24moral terms but sometimes is explained economically: confidentiality
leaves unredressed the social harms that led to the lawsuit (e.g., toxic dump-
ing), imposing negative externalities,25 costs borne by third parties.26 Though
logical, both sides' economic slogans fail to depict the far more nuanced,
complex reality of litigation and settlement.
This Article seeks to fill the void in the economic thinking about confi-
dential settlements. It aims to improve upon the largely superficial economic
debate so far-"efficiently increasing settlement" versus "inefficiently im-
posing externalities"-and, in doing so, reaches quite different findings
about the incentive effects of a confidentiality ban. Part I reviews the tradi-
tional economic model of when cases settle and its view that confidentiality
increases the incentive to settle. Part II then presents novel economic analy-
ses that depict a reality more complex than, and often contrary to, those of
the traditional model.
Sections II.A and II.B note two key distinctions absent from the tradi-
tional model. Section II.A shows how banning confidentiality actually may
promote settlements: a ban could not effectively cover settlements reached
before litigation, so a ban reaching only postfiling settlements would yield
more confidential prefiling settlements. This pre-/postfiling distinction is an
example of unintuitive, unintended consequences resulting from a regulation
having gaps in its coverage. Section II.B then analyzes how a ban would
affect high- and low-value cases differently, depending on whether public-
ity-conscious defendants worry more about one big settlement or several
small ones.
Sections II.C and II.D discuss two informational benefits of increased
settlement disclosure. Section II.D notes litigation benefits: knowing prior
cases' settlement amounts would help parties determine their own settlement
value, and decreasing litigation uncertainty could decrease frivolous law-
suits. Section II.D notes benefits in labor, consumer, and investment
markets: more information about which companies pay more in settlements
could lessen the problem of those who are under-informed rationally "over-
24. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 1, at 947 ("[Tlhe backbone of the argument against confi-
dentiality [is] the right of the public to know... ").
25. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 590 (3d ed. 1995)
(defining externalities).
26. David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid
Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1232 (criticizing secrecy as
"resulting in the needless injury of more people"); Drahozal & Hines, supra note 17, at 115 ("The
principal argument against secret settlements .... [is that they] harm the public by suppressing
information about health and other hazards."); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Be-
tween the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 605
(1997) ("[Slociety would benefit from ... information .... [from a] firm that wants to keep its
product defect secret .... "); Zitrin, supra note 10, at 887 (explaining the value of restricting confi-
dentiality in section entitled, "Absent Stronger Rules, Secrecy Will Continue to Endanger the
Public"); Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements
and Litigants'Economic Incentives, 54 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 434-36 (2005) ("[Tlhe real problem...
[is] divergence between societal and individual costs and benefits .... [Slecrecy threatens to per-
petuate unexposed danger, imposing costs upon others .... ).
[Vol. 105:867
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avoiding" jobs, goods, or investments that might be dangerous. Avoiding a
whole industry because of a few bad apples, people may shift to inferior
alternatives, all because of an information problem-inability to determine
which of the apples are good and which are bad-that more settlement dis-
closure would help remedy.
Overall, Part II shows that a confidentiality ban's effect of decreasing
postfiling settlements would be offset by more prefiling settlements. Even if
settlements decreased (on the net), prefiling settlements save more litigation
costs, so total costs might decrease; even if costs do not decrease, a ban
might have efficient dynamic effects, such as deterring frivolous lawsuits
and improving market decisions. Notwithstanding these desirable effects,
the presence of so many opposing forces precludes easy prediction of the
net effect-contrary to the traditional model's simple, conclusive story. A
jurisdiction banning confidentiality thus would be undertaking a worthy
experiment with a promising but uncertainty-clouded policy.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENTS,
CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHERWISE
Economic modeling of litigation has long been a staple of economic
27analysis of law. Recently, numerous scholars have modified traditional
economic models of litigation in various ways, such as by applying cutting-
edge modeling methods," applying modem social science theories of human• 29
behavior, or applying traditional models in novel ways.30 Nevertheless,
even the most creative models are essentially tweakings of the traditional
model, which remains the starting point for any meaningful economic think-
ing on litigation.
The traditional economic model of litigation predicts that all cases will
settle.3 However, settlement often occurs late in the litigation process, or not
at all, for various reasons. Most relevant for present purposes, settlement
may occur late or not at all when, due to optimism and/or incomplete
27. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
20-40 (2003); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 392-99 (4th ed. 2004); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 135-46 (3d ed. 2003); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563-606 (6th ed. 2003).
28. E.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (2006) (modeling litigation with "real options
theory," one of "the tools applied to the economic analysis of research and development projects").
29. E.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 302 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (applying behavioral economics to analyze why parties fail to bargain after cases end).
30. E.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs,
91 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (proposing the halving of litigation costs by only litigating a random-
ized half of all cases brought before courts, but awarding double damages in those cases that are
litigated).
31. See infra Section I.A. I.
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information, the parties have divergent beliefs as to the merits of the claim.32
Confidentiality of settlements, in the traditional model, is an important in-
ducement to the defendant to settle (and to offer more in settlement) because
it allows the defendant to avoid costly public disclosures of negative infor-
mation.33 Banning confidentiality would decrease the amounts defendants
offer in settlement, thereby decreasing the frequency and sizes of settle-
ments, according to the traditional model.34 After Part I presents key aspects
of the traditional model, Part II discusses why these are mere half-truths-
points that are true but that yield inaccurate conclusions because they are
merely part of a larger story.
A. The Economics of Litigation Settlement:
Why Cases Do and Don't Settle
1. The Basic Economic Model:
Why Cases Should (and Usually Do) Settle
In the economic model of settlement that is based on the parties' mone-
tary costs and benefits, the settlement value is the expected value ("EV") of
the claim, i.e., the probability of a plaintiff's verdict ("p") times the mone-
tary amount of such a verdict ("L"), adjusted for the parties' litigation costs
(C, and Co).35 The defendant will offer any amount less than the EV of the
claim plus its litigation costs; the plaintiff is willing to accept any amount
more than EV minus its own litigation costs. As long as either party has liti-
gation costs, all cases will settle, because the defendant's maximum offer
36
will exceed the plaintiff's minimum.
Where:
p = probability of plaintiff prevailing
LM = amount of monetary liability if plaintiff wins
pLM = expected value of verdict (probability times amount)37
32. See infra Section I.A.2. Of course, economic theory does account for other reasons that
cases may not settle, or at least may not settle as early as they should. See infra note 51. This Article
focuses on divergent expectations as a reason for not settling simply because that is the reason most
directly impacted by whether or not settlements are confidential.
33. See infra Section I.B.
34. See infra Section I.B.
35. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28, at 1273 ("[Tjhe lawsuit's expected value is typically
described as the probability that the plaintiff will prevail multiplied by the likely award.");
POLINSKY, supra note 27, at 135-36. For algebraic and numerical examples of this analysis, see
BONE, supra note 27, at 73-74, 89-90; POLIN SKY, supra note 27, at 135-38.
36. See BONE, supra note 27, at 75, 89.
37. More precisely, "[tihe expected value ... [of] an uncertain situation is a weighted aver-
age of the payoffs or values resulting from all possible outcomes. The probabilities of each outcome






CD = defendant's remaining litigation costs if settlement not reached
C, = plaintiff's remaining litigation costs if settlement not reached
Oo = defendant's reservation price (maximum acceptable offer)
38
0, = plaintiff's reservation price (minimum acceptable offer)39
Then:
0, = pLM + C, (i.e., D offers anything less than expected
Liability plus D's litigation costs)
0, = pLM - C, (i.e., P accepts anything above expected
liability minus P's litigation costs)
Thus:
O = 0, + (C0+C,)
Oo  > Op (as long as (Co+C,) is a positive number)
Settlement range: 0 3 [ pLM - C,, pLM + Co ]
Settlement surplus (width of range):'
Co + Cp
In sum, due to litigation costs, there is a settlement surplus, an amount
between the parties' reservation prices (their "bottom line" offers) that
leaves room to negotiate-so long as the parties sufficiently agree on p and
L, the likelihood and size of a plaintiff's verdict. As discussed below, dis-
agreement among the parties as to p or L (typically with each party being
overconfident), can inhibit settlement-but only to a point.
4'
2. The Basic Economic Model with Divergent Beliefs:
Why Some Cases Don't Settle Quickly
Parties to lawsuits commonly begin their dispute in a state of "mutual op-
timism": typically, plaintiffs overestimate the EV of their claims, while
defendants underestimate the EV of plaintiffs' claims.4 2 "A common feature of
human behavior is overoptimism," scholars have noted, including in the litiga-
tion context.43 Certainly, not all people are optimists; but people pessimistic
about their legal claims are less likely to file lawsuits and, when they do file,
By way of example: a lawsuit with a 50% chance of a defense verdict (EV=$O), a 40% chance
of a $10,000 verdict (EV=$4,000), and a 10% chance of a $50,000 verdict (EV=$5,000) yields a
total EV of $9,000. See, e.g., BONE, supra note 27, at 23-26 (providing a similar example).
38. BONE, supra note 27, at 74.
39. Id.
40. The math works out as follows: the width of the settlement range is the plaintiff's reser-
vation price (0,) minus the defendant's reservation price (O):
0, - 0. = (pL. - C,) - (pLM + CO) = CP + C,
41. For a brief discussion of other reasons cases may not settle, or at least may not settle as
early as they should, see infra note 51.
42. BONE, supra note 27, at 85-9 1.
43. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law &
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1524 (1998).
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are more eager to settle quickly. The pool of cases in litigation is dispropor-
tionately populated by litigants optimistic about their legal positions.
Litigant optimism makes cases less likely to settle: litigation costs pro-
vide insufficient incentive to settle if the plaintiff thinks its odds of winning
(p) are 90% while the defendant thinks the odds are 10%, or if plaintiff
thinks defendant's monetary liability (LM) is $100,000 while defendant
thinks it would be $10,000.4 Divergent estimates of p and LM may prevent







plaintiff's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
defendant's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
plaintiff's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
defendant's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
Then a settlement surplus exists (i.e., the case still will settle) if:5
O, < On (i.e., if D's maximum offer is below P's minimum)
ppLm(p) < pdLM(d) + (Cp+CD)
ppLM(p) < pdLM(d) < (CI+CD)
(EVp - EVd) < (Cp+CD) (i.e., if litigation costs exceed the
difference in EVs)
44. This model considers divergence in the parties' p estimates, not their L estimates, but
mathematically, the same point would remain if the divergence were in L rather than in p.
Where: LM.P) = plaintiff's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
L ,d, = defendant's estimate of odds of plaintiff prevailing at trial
Then a settlement surplus exists (>0) if:
O, < Oo
- pLMpp) - Cp < pLM(d) + CD
- L. , - L. , < (CP+C,)/p
45. In the special case that only p varies or only LM varies, the situation is the same, though
with simpler math:
(I) Only p Varies:
0 < OD
pPLM - C, < pL. + CD
ppLM - pLM < C,+C.
(EV, - EVd) < (C,+C)
(11) Only L, Varies:
O, < o
pL.(P) - CP < pLMd) + CD
pLm~p) - C, < pLM~d) + CD
(EVP - EVd) < (Cl+C)
(same as in main text above)
If the parties diverge as to only one of p or LM, we can specify the conditions for settlement with a
bit more particularity, however:
pPL. - p4L, < Cp+C0
(P, - Pd) < (CP+C.)/L.
pLm) - CP < pLMd) + CD
(Second to last equation just above)
Lmp) - Lm,,) < (Cp+Co)/p
In (I), where only p varies, the condition for settlement is that the divergence in p is not larger
than the litigation costs as a fraction of the monetary liability. In (II), where only L. varies, the
condition for settlement is that the divergence in LM is not larger than the litigation costs divided by
the probability of a plaintiff's victory.
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The last expression above illustrates that even with mutual optimism, a
case still should settle as long as the difference in expectations is not greater
than the parties' total litigation costs. If the difference in expectations is
large enough (and litigation costs not correspondingly large), however, the
case will not settle.
Importantly, even if the parties' views are divergent enough to prevent
early settlement, a later settlement remains likely-as the data on high set-
tlement rates confirm. 46 Optimism is easy for parties to maintain when each
side lacks key information on the other side's evidence and arguments,
which is typical early in litigation; before the parties get too far in litigation,
each is unlikely to recognize its own weaknesses and its opponents'
strengths . This information asymmetry is why the plaintiff can believe that
p is high while the defendant can believe that p is low in the same case-a
divergence that makes the parties less willing to compromise to save litiga-
tion costs. 48 Over the course of litigation, however, the parties exchange
evidence and challenge each other in discovery and pretrial motions (e.g.,
discovery motions or dismissal motions), which tends to deflate the self-
servingly optimistic views of both: the plaintiff's estimate of p falls ("Wait,
there's actually a chance I could lose?!") while the defendant's estimate of p
rises ("Wait, there's actually a chance he could win?!").
49
In economic terms, lawsuits begin with imperfect and asymmetric in-
formation; pretrial practice is the process of information exchange that
increases, and equalizes, the parties' information. As Robert Bone explains,
"[als the lawsuit progresses ... through discovery[,] ... [a]t some point...
the parties['] estimates are likely to converge sufficiently to create a settle-
ment range and a positive settlement surplus . 5.0.."'o This economic insight
explains why the vast majority of cases do settle, but do not all settle early
in the parties' dispute.5'
46. See Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, I I HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 40 (2006) ("According to data from the federal courts, ninety-eight percent of all civil cases
and ninety-five percent of criminal cases settle through agreement of the parties or are withdrawn
from the court without a final court decision.").
47. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 27, at 407 ("[Tihe defendant knows less than the plain-
tiff about the extent of the injury, and the plaintiff knows less than the defendant about the extent of
the defendant's precautions....").
48. BONE, supra note 27, at 85-91. L also could vary, to the same effect.
49. Of course, as a case progresses, the parties' monetary incentive to settle (saving litigation
costs) decreases because fewer litigation costs remain. But litigation costs accumulate at a more
gradual pace (i.e., a few hundred dollars for every hour of attorney effort), whereas discovery can
turn a nonsettling case into a settlement in short order because a major discovery event can abruptly
change the parties' estimates of p. For example, the plaintiff's claim may fall apart after a major
admission in a deposition, or the defendant may get scared after the plaintiff finds a key document.
50. BONE, supra note 27, at 90-91; see also Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluc-
tant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 34 (2006)
("Litigation occurs only when parties either cannot or do not predict what the court will do. If courts
are predictable and the result can be accurately determined in advance, rational parties will settle.").
51. Of course, there are other reasons parties do not settle. For example, emotions like re-
venge or passion can counteract monetary incentives to settle, in which case a plaintiff's L would
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B. The Basic Economic Model with Confidentiality:
Confidentiality Increases the Settlement Range
Because It Is Valuable to Defendants
Settlement confidentiality increases defendants' willingness to settle be-
cause the liability costs of lawsuits, to defendants, go beyond just monetary
liability. Part of the liability (L) to defendants is reputational cost (LR), the
cost of undesirable public knowledge of a verdict or settlement it pays. Re-
putational costs include more than one kind of harm to defendants. One is
the risk that a public settlement will give the defendant "a reputation for
settling," which might "encourage rogue plaintiffs with meritless claims to
attempt to extract settlement[s], 52 as Richard Posner53 and Richard Epstein54
argue. Another type of reputational cost is loss of goodwill: laws mandating
more disclosure can "raise [a] corporation's 'embarrassment cost,' . . . to a
prohibitively high level"
55 by deterring "potential" customers or investors;
56
or, as Abraham Lincoln more pungently observed, "what kills a skunk is the
publicity it gives itself."57 For present purposes, it does not matter in which
sense a publicly disclosed settlement hurts a defendant's reputation, whether
giving it a bad name in the community or giving it a reputation as an "easy
mark" for plaintiffs. Either way, public settlements impose costs beyond the
money defendants pay.
exceed L., because L would include money plus the emotional value of a verdict. See Peter H.
Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 31, 32
(1992). Settlement also may be delayed by hard bargaining or psychological biases such as anchor-
ing effects (e.g., sticking to now obsolete initial offers) and endowment and status quo effects that
dissuade parties from deals that change their positions. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 797 (2004).
52. Lothes, supra note 26, at 456-57 ("[I]f the defendant establishes a reputation for settling,
she may encourage rogue plaintiffs with meritless claims to attempt to extract settlement ....
[O]penness provides fodder for nuisance suits... "); see also BONE, supra note 27, at 66; POSNER,
supra note 27, at 570; David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 6 (1985).
53. POSNER, supra note 27, at 570.
54. Epstein postulates "mandatory disclosure would likely have the effect of increasing
dubious as well as sound litigation." He explains as follows:
[lI]nformation obtained by one plaintiff will become readily available to others. This will re-
duce the cost of filing lawsuits, and increase the number of "follow-on" suits. The publication
of settlement figures, even in cases where the defendant has fought the case very hard, will
likewise encourage more plaintiffs to file suit against the defendant.
Richard A. Epstein, The disclosure dilemma: Why a ban on secret legal settlements does more harm
than good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at DI.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corpo-
rate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1251 (1977) (critiquing
disclosure requirements in federal securities laws).
56. See id. at 1255-56.
57. THE WORDSWORTH DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 237 (Connie Robertson, ed., 2001).
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Given that the predominant "secrecy versus publicity" preference is de-
fendants' preference for secrecy,58 the presence of LR widens the settlement
range, which now exists because of not only litigation costs, but also the
reputational cost a defendant suffers from a plaintiff's verdict, which makes
L higher for defendants than for plaintiffs. This difference in L widens the
settlement range when the defendant can eliminate the reputational cost by
reaching a confidential settlement. Formally, the defendant's reservation
price (0o), or maximum offer, rises by pLR, from pLM to p(LM+LR), which
increases the settlement surplus (i.e., widens the settlement range):
Where:
L = LM + L, (i.e., D's liability is both monetary &
reputational)
Then:
0, = pLM - C, (same as in the Section IL.A models
with no LR)
- 0, = p(LM+LR) + C0  (higher than in Section II.A: L rises
from LM to LM+LR)
Settlement range: 0 3 [ pLM - Cp, p(LM+LR) + CD]
Settlement surplus: CD + Cp, pL
Increase in surplus: pLR (surplus "increases" compared to the
Section II.A models)
Thus, when a verdict or public settlement imposes reputational costs, the
amount a defendant will pay for a confidential settlement exceeds what it
would pay for a non-confidential settlement that would not eliminate LR.
This is the traditional economic argument for allowing confidentiality; as
Posner explains,
"keep[ing] the terms of the settlement secret... becomes an inducement to
defendants to settle large cases to avoid a public judgment .... Ordinarily
58. Admittedly, parties' confidentiality preferences vary; while most defendants want se-
crecy, there are three other possibilities-but they are of little significance to this Article's analyses:
(1) Plaintiffs may value confidentiality too--but for two reasons, plaintiffs on average will
not value confidentiality as much as defendants. First, plaintiffs do not share defendants' concern
about publicity spurring copycat lawsuits. Second, the most confidentiality-minded plaintiffs can opt
out of litigation (i.e., not file suit if they badly fear disclosure of harmful information), but the most
confidentiality-minded defendants cannot opt out of being sued.
(2) Plaintiffs may value publicity. A plaintiff may want a public verdict to obtain justice and
vindication, but (1) many lawsuits are just about the money, and (2) even if some plaintiffs value
publicity, the fact that most settlements are confidential indicates that the "premium" defendants
offer for secrecy is enough to overcome most plaintiffs' desire for publicity.
(3) Defendants may value publicity, not confidentiality. A defendant may think it has a good
chance of deterring future lawsuits by winning a defense verdict. But those situations likely are
infrequent; defense verdicts do not get public attention ("Plaintiff Loses Lawsuit" is not a common
headline) unless the lawsuit is novel in some way.
Thus, the predominant secrecy/publicity preference is defendants' desire for secrecy, which is
why most scholars have focused on that preference rather than on the above three other possibilities.
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the plaintiff will be happy to agree to such a confidentiality provision be-
cause it will enable a quicker and larger settlement. 59
Conversely, a ban on confidential settlements decreases settlement by
eliminating this widening of the settlement range. In some cases at the mar-
gins of being "settlable," the parties could reach a settlement if
confidentiality were on the table but could not do so without confidentiality
available; the plaintiff's ability to sell silence makes the difference in con-
vincing the defendant to offer enough for the plaintiff to accept. The loss to
the settlement surplus is pLR (as explained immediately above), so that loss
is greatest when p and LR are high, i.e.:
(1) when the claim is meritorious, i.e., when p is high;
(2) when the alleged injury is substantial, i.e., when LR is high, which will
tend to be when LM is high (i.e., more bad press from a high-level injury
and damages award); and
(3) when the defendant is more reputation-sensitive (e.g., more dependent
on customer goodwill or more fearful of similar future lawsuits).
Points (1) and (2) in particular show a troubling repercussion of banning
confidentiality: a ban would inhibit settlement most when claims are most
worthy, that is, when the plaintiff actually suffered a substantial injury (high
L) for which the defendant likely is liable (high P). Without confidentiality,
the worthy plaintiff is less likely to obtain an acceptable settlement, and a
defendant facing serious risk of liability is less likely to make that plaintiff
an acceptable offer.
This is a bleak cautionary tale of a no-confidentiality regime, but it is
only part of the story-the ugly part, yet the most widely noted part. Part II
discusses several positive features (and some ambiguous aspects) of a no-
confidentiality regime, brightening the prospects of a world without confi-
dentiality.
II. A NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS:
ACCELERATING SETTLEMENT, DECREASING FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION, AND
OTHER UNINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF BANNING CONFIDENTIALITY
The traditional model's depiction of confidential settlements contains a
great deal of truth but is so incomplete that it ultimately misleads more than
it explains. Yes, banning confidentiality would decrease defendants' incen-
tive to make higher settlement offers during litigation, because settlements
59. POSTER, supra note 27, at 570; see also Shavell, supra note 26, at 605 (1997) ("[S]ecrecy
... helps to explain why [parties] settle .... [A] firm whose product was defective may not want
this information to come to public light and ... the victim may not much care whether the informa-
tion is revealed."); Epstein, supra note 54 ("[Mlandatory settlement disclosure may make it harder
for individual plaintiffs to get justice in a timely manner. Defendants who fear follow-on litigation
will likely seek to postpone settlement ... to prevent the details of the case from becoming known
... [and] resist[ ]... discovery.").
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would no longer save them from all reputational costs. But there is much
more to the story.
Section II.A illustrates how banning settlement confidentiality actually
may promote settlements. As Section II.A explains, a confidentiality ban
could not cover settlements reached before litigation commences, so it could
deter only postfiling settlements. Consequently, a ban would encourage set-
tlements prefiling, when parties still could obtain confidentiality. It is hard to
measure these competing effects, but a shift to more prefiling but fewer
postfiling settlements seems promising because earlier settlements save
more litigation costs.
Section II.B notes another critical distinction that the traditional model
neglects: the effects of a confidentiality ban will differ for high-value and
low-value cases. Some defendants may fear publicity from one big public
settlement more than that from several small settlements, but the reverse
may be true for others. Section II.B discusses how the effects of confidenti-
ality would vary among high- and low-value cases, depending mainly on
whether defendants more greatly fear disclosure of a few large settlements
or disclosure of many small settlements. However, because defendants vary
as to their confidentiality preferences (because, for example, they vary in
how disclosed settlements would be viewed by customers or business part-
ners), we cannot predict whether banning confidentiality would affect high-
or low-value cases more overall. This is a note of caution that certain effects
of banning confidentiality may be quite unpredictable, contrary to the tradi-
tional model's assertion that banning confidentiality would spur more low-
value frivolous suits.
Section II.C notes that banning confidentiality, by increasing public dis-
closure of settlements, would improve the efficiency of litigation and
settlement decisions. With better information about the value of similar legal
claims, parties to litigation would know more about whether to settle and for
how much. Similarly, requiring settlement disclosure would decrease litiga-
tion uncertainty, and, as shown by recent economic scholarship modeling
litigation as "real options,"6 decreasing litigation uncertainty likely deters
frivolous claims.
Section II.D notes a non-litigation benefit of increased settlement disclo-
sure: better decision-making by market participants, such as employees
making job decisions or consumers and investors making buying decisions.
With more information about which companies pay what in lawsuits, em-
ployees, consumers, and investors could make better-informed decisions.
Currently, there is little good public information about which jobs or prod-
ucts are the ones to avoid, so people rationally but excessively avoid ones
that might be hazardous-e.g., avoiding jobs in an entire industry in which
some employers allow harassment, or avoiding an entire product line be-
cause of some hazardous items. Such over-avoidance can lead people to
choose worse off-market alternatives. More information about who are (or
60. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28.
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are not) the "bad apples" paying significant liability costs would mitigate
this problem of uncertainty inducing inefficient choices.
As a whole, Part II illustrates that even though a confidentiality ban
would decrease postfiling settlements, (1) there would be an offsetting in-
crease in prefiling settlements; (2) even if the total number of settlements
decreased, total litigation costs might decrease because prefiling settlements
save more litigation costs; and (3) even if a ban did not lead to more settle-
ment efficiency, it still might have efficient dynamic effects such as
discouraging frivolous lawsuits and improving labor and consumer market
efficiency. Thus, while we must be cautious about predicting the net effects
of a confidentiality ban, there is reason to think that, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom of the existing economic literature, the benefits of a
confidentiality ban would be real and many.
In short, while the traditional economic model views a ban on confiden-
tiality as an inefficient anti-market proscription that prevents parties from
transacting as to something of value (i.e., concealment of information harm-
ful to defendants), Part II shows the reality to be more nuanced and
complex. Given the wide array of competing effects, it is impossible to pre-
dict the net effect of banning confidentiality. The most we can say is that a
confidentiality ban would be a promising but uncertain experiment-a nu-
anced conclusion that stands in stark contrast to the simplistic "pro-
confidentiality" conventional economic wisdom.
A. Prefiling vs. Postfiling Settlements: Settlements Occurring
Earlier Because Confidentiality Will Remain Available
Only for Prefiling Settlements
1. The Inability of a Confidentiality Ban to Reach
Prefiling Settlements Effectively
a. The Ease of Enforced Disclosure of Postfiling Settlements; the
Difficulty of Enforced Disclosure of Prefiling Settlements
A ban on confidential settlements of cases in litigation would be easy to
implement and enforce: either legislation or a simple committee of judges
could amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Rule 41 currently allows
parties the unfettered right to dismiss their cases upon reaching a settlement;
all that is necessary to ban confidentiality is for Rule 41 to state that the
court-filed dismissal stipulation must attach a copy of the parties' settlement
agreement. This would be analogous to existing federal court rules requiring
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Illuminating Secrecy
disclosure into the court record of class action settlements 6 and plea bargain
62agreements (essentially "settlements" of criminal cases).
In contrast, no ban on confidential settlements can expect to reach all
prefiling settlements-settlements of disputes not yet filed in court. Parties
commonly settle employment disputes, for example, by agreeing that the
employee will leave the employer in exchange for a severance agreement
that (typical of severance agreements) includes a waiver of any workplace
61
claims the employee might have. Such settlements are basically indistin-
guishable from typical severance offers made to departing employees not
embroiled in any workplace dispute; even when no lawsuit has been threat-
ened, employers making severance offers typically demand that departing
employees, in exchange for their severance, sign a release of any legal
claims whatsoever. Similarly, in a customer-manufacturer dispute over a
defective product, a prefiling settlement is the same as a simple agreement
by the manufacturer to reimburse the purchaser's losses, such as the cost of
a replacement (which may be substantial for an expensive product like a car
or a home furnace) and the cost of any injuries resulting from the defect
(e.g., medical expenses). In short, a prelitigation settlement is just a contrac-
tual agreement by two parties that is never seen by anyone else; it flies well
below the radar of any court or agency that might have jurisdiction over a
ban on confidential settlements.
Thus, even if a ban on confidential settlements is enacted and the legal
system enters a "no-confidentiality regime," that ban could expect to cover
only postfiling settlements; it could not reliably prevent confidentiality of
prefiling settlements.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring disclosure to court and all class members of proposed
settlement agreements).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(2) ("Disclosing a Plea Agreement. The parties must disclose the
plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the court for good cause allows the
parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera."); id. 1I(c)(4) ("If the court accepts the plea
agreement.., the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.").
63. Attempting pre-litigation settlement is standard practice for plaintiffs' lawyers, who try
to negotiate to avoid having their clients, employees with legal claims against their employers, ever
become "plaintiffs." See, e.g., Wayne N. Outten et al., Overview of Workplace Claims in New York:
Perspective of Employees' Counsel, 662 PRAC. L. INST. (LIT1G.) 1179, 1183 (2001) (advising fellow
plaintiffs' employment lawyers to "try every possible avenue to resolve the dispute without ...
formal litigation[,]" beginning with pre-lawsuit settlement talks and then "escalat[ing] confrontation
incrementally").
64. See, e.g., Patricia Costello Slovak, Labor and Employment Law Issues in the Acquiring
or Selling of a Privately Held Company, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COM-
PANY 2003, at 883, 888 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1375, 2003)
(encouraging downsizing companies to offer "early retirement incentive plans ... [with] enhanced
severance or retirement benefits... in exchange for a release of employment-related claims").
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b. Creative Efforts to Reach Prefiling Confidentiality:
Limited Prospects for Success
Conceivably, a ban on confidential settlements could try to reach prefil-
ing settlements in one of three ways-but none would be truly effective, at
least not nearly to the same extent as a ban on postfiling settlements.
First, courts could declare that confidentiality clauses in even private
(i.e., not court-filed) settlement agreements are unenforceable, so that plain-
tiffs who promise confidentiality would remain free to blab without
repercussions. Such prefiling settlements still would be much less likely to
become truly "public" than postfiling settlements required to be filed in
court, however. Postfiling settlements would be public documents available
to online or physical searches by law firms, academics, or the media. Be-
cause settlement data would be quite valuable, it would very likely be
compiled in "settlement reporters" analogous to the litany of "jury verdict
61reporters" on the market today. It is hard to see how very many prefiling
settlements would become so publicly available: most plaintiffs lack the
sophistication to know whom to alert, those researching settlements would
not know where to find parties who settle clandestinely, and the mainstream
media would not often be interested enough in run-of-the-mill settlements to
cover them.66
Second, the defendant could insist that the plaintiff enter an oral, under-
the-table "side deal" for secrecy, even if such secrecy clauses are banned. Of
course, plaintiffs could breach those illegal "side deals" without legal con-
sequence, but defendants could create incentives for plaintiffs to comply.
Unlike plaintiffs, plaintiffs' lawyers are repeat players in the legal system, so
they have an incentive to prevail upon their clients to keep quiet: if this
plaintiff keeps quiet, then the defendant will trust this plaintiff's lawyer to
keep future clients quiet, so this plaintiff's lawyer could get more money
out of that defendant in future settlements. Additionally, defendants could
insist on partially deferred settlement payouts, perhaps spacing the payouts
over a year or two; if the plaintiff breaches the illegal "secrecy side deal,"
then the defendant couldn't legally withhold the extra funds, but it might do
so anyway, because any effort by the plaintiff to sue for unpaid settlement
67proceeds likely would not be 100% successful. Finally, in some cases, de-
fendants will have embarrassing information about the plaintiff, such as
medical evidence or information about the plaintiff's shortcomings as an
65. See, for example, Jury Verdict Summaries from the National Association of State Jury
Verdict Publishers, http://www.juryverdicts.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).
66. While settlement data is newsworthy in the aggregate, most settlements are not newswor-
thy individually; "Smith Barney's Discrimination Settlements Exceed Industry Average" is a
headline, but "Smith Barney Pays Plaintiff X $20,000" is not.
67. Two key limitations on a plaintiff's ability to collect settlement proceeds in a lawsuit are
(1) that a plaintiff who had agreed to secrecy might well lose under the "unclean hands" doctrine
and (2) that even the strongest debt-collection claim settles for less than 100 cents on the dollar (in
part because, as Section L.A explains, litigation costs induce parties, including plaintiffs in entirely
meritorious suits, to compromise).
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employee. The defendant could easily threaten the plaintiff by saying that if
the plaintiff disclosed the settlement, the defendant would disclose any in-
formation it had about the plaintiff. The information would not have to be
incredibly personally embarrassing; a simple recitation of a plaintiff's on-
the-job failings, for example, could harm her re-employment prospects.
Thus, in various ways, a defendant could penalize a plaintiff to some degree
for violating a secrecy side deal.
Third, courts could declare that if a settlement has a confidentiality
clause, then the plaintiff's waiver of her claim is invalid, and the plaintiff
can sue despite reaching the "settlement., 68 This would be a drastic step, but
even this would have little practical effect for one critical reason. In a law-
suit following a confidential settlement, even if the plaintiff won at trial, the
damages award would likely be reduced by the amount he or she already
received in the (invalid) confidential settlement. That is the weight of au-
thority under the one major statute declaring certain kinds of settlements
invalid, the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA"). The
OWBPA imposes strict requirements on waivers of federal age discrimina-
tion claims and declares invalid any waivers of claims contained in
69
noncompliant settlements . Where a plaintiff sues after agreeing to a settle-
ment in which the waiver of claims violated the OWBPA, courts typically
reduce any eventual damages award by the amount of money received in the
settlement.70
The sort of "damages offset" applicable in OWBPA cases would apply
with even more force in the context of a ban on confidential settlements.
After all, a plaintiff who signs a waiver lacking the worker-protective
OWBPA requirements typically was not herself complicit in the violation;7 ,
courts do not begrudge the plaintiff her later lawsuit, because it was the
68. Dana & Koniak, supra note 26, at 1219 (arguing that confidential settlements should be
"null and void," civilly "actionable:' and subject to "mandatory sanctions" for the participating
attorneys, and even "punishable" under criminal law); Daughety & Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety,
supra note 23, at 1087 ("In order to truly eliminate confidentiality, courts ... would have to refuse
to enforce private contracts of silence. Otherwise, confidential settlements would simply be pushed
into this area of contracts, where they would be subject to even less judicial oversight.").
69. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000).
70. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, No. 96-C-0902, 1997 WL 156483, at *3 (N.D.
I11. Mar. 31, 1997) (holding that, where plaintiff sued after signing an invalid waiver under OWBPA,
the appropriate damages rule was "reducing the amount of any recovery ... by the amount of the
consideration received for the waiver"); Rangel v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 996 F. Supp. 1093, 1099
(D.N.M. 1998) (following Blackwell); cf 29 C.ER. § 1625.23(c)(1) (2006) ("[Ciourts have the
discretion to determine whether an employer is entitled to restitution, recoupment or setoff ...
against the employee's monetary award."); Cole v. Gaming Entm't, 199 F. Supp. 2d 208, 216 (D.
Del. 2002) ( "[I]f [plaintiff] is successful ... it may be appropriate to reduce any monetary recovery
by the amount ... received for the waiver."). But see Kulling v. Grinders for Indus., 185 F Supp. 2d
800, 814-15 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding no requirement that Age Discrimination in Employment
Act plaintiffs' damages be set off by their severance partially because plaintiff's waiver was invalid
only as to his ADEA claims but valid for other claims that remained waived).
71. The OWIBPA essentially requires various procedures and disclosure requirements of
employers to benefit older workers. See generally Eric A. Taussig, The Older Workers Benefit Pro-




defendant who violated the OWBPA and must suffer the consequences of an
invalid waiver. In contrast, under a no-confidentiality regime, a plaintiff who
signs an illegally confidential settlement is entirely complicit in the illegality
and would have benefited from it, by inducing the defendant to pay "hush
money" in the settlement. 71 It is hard to see how an innocent OWBPA plain-
tiff could suffer a damages setoff while a non-innocent confidential
settlement plaintiff would not.73
Thus, even if a confidentiality ban went so far as to declare that a plain-
tiff could still sue after getting paid in an illegally confidential settlement,
the plaintiff's incentive to sue would be markedly lower, because her dam-
ages likely (at least probabilistically) would be reduced by the amount
already received in the settlement. Similarly, as discussed above, even if
plaintiffs who settled were allowed to breach their confidentiality promises,
prefiling settlements would be much more likely to remain hidden than post-
filing settlements. For this reason, even in a no-confidentiality regime,
prelawsuit confidential settlements would remain effective; a defendant set-
tling prefiling cannot be sure the settlement will remain out of public view,
but that defendant certainly has a much better chance of keeping it out of
public view when it settles prefiling.
2. The Beneficial Aspect of a Confidentiality Ban
Being Limited to Posfiling Settlements
a. Incentive to Accelerate Settlement
Although this "pre versus post" distinction is a critical one, it has gone
unanalyzed by virtually the entire literature on confidential settlements. A
recent short symposium piece by Christopher Drahozal and Laura Hines
does note the distinction briefly, observing that if confidentiality were
banned, parties could "readily avoid" that ban with a prefiling settlement.74
Drahozal and Hines, however, do not analyze why a ban could not reach
prefiling settlements effectively, as discussed above; neither do they note
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting how not only defendants, but also
plaintiffs, have an incentive to contract for secrecy).
73. Further, it is possible that courts would be constitutionally required to impose a damages
setoff. If a court allowed a plaintiff to recover a verdict of full compensatory damages after a settle-
ment of at least partial compensation for the same loss, it would be awarding damages above the
amount necessary to compensate, so the damages award would be punitive in nature. The Supreme
Court several times recently has limited plaintiffs' ability to recover punitive damages. See BMW of
N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996) (applying multi-factor test to reject punitive damages
award under substantive due process); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429
(2003) (holding same, establishing rigor of Gore test); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (holding that review is de novo of jury's punitive damages award); Kolstad
v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (establishing affirmative defense to punitive dam-
ages liability).
A full examination of this constitutional issue is beyond the scope of this Article (and perhaps
worthy of its own article). It suffices here to note that constitutional considerations make it all the
more likely that courts would set off damages by the amount of a prior settlement.
74. Drahozal & Hines, supra note 17, at 127.
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that even if a ban encourages prefiling settlements, that is not necessarily
undesirable "circumvention." Even if a confidentiality ban could reach pre-
filing settlements, moreover, it may be more desirable to limit the ban to
postfiling settlements, as discussed below.75
With a ban covering only postfiling settlements, prefiling settlements
could still be confidential and thereby save the defendant reputational costs
(L,). Indeed, a settlement immediately prefiling is a defendant's last chance
to settle before liability rises from LM to (LM + LR). Consequently, in a no-
confidentiality regime, the presence of reputational costs creates a critical
difference between pre- and postfiling settlements. Because only a prefiling
settlement saves the defendant reputational costs (i.e., saves the defendant
from having liability increase after filing from LM to LM + LR), a no-
confidentiality regime incentivizes defendants to be more generous with
prefiling settlements:
Defendant's maximum offer: 0, = pL + CD
Prefiling (with confidentiality): 0, = p(LM+LR) + C,
Settlement range: OD 3 [pL_ - C,, p(LM+LR) + CD]
Settlement surplus (width of range): C, + C, + pLR
Postfiling (without confidentiality): Oo = pLM + Co
Settlement range: 0 3 [pLM - C,, pL. + C]
Settlement surplus (width of range): C, + Cn
Thus, banning confidentiality would appear to accelerate settlement,
76
both because increasing public information facilitates negotiations and
because defendants would be more generous with prefiling settlements than
with postfiling settlements. Plaintiffs, knowing of this latter effect, would be
more likely to accept defendants' prefiling offers.77 With only postfiling con-
fidentiality banned, the parties would make a serious settlement push
immediately prefiling, because that would be their last chance to settle be-
fore losing part of the settlement value, plaintiff's ability to "sell
confidentiality" to the defendant.
Interestingly, while banning confidentiality seems likely to accelerate
settlement, a leading advocate of allowing confidentiality has said exactly
the opposite, though without any real analysis of parties' incentives. In a
frequently cited article, 8 Arthur Miller criticized proposed restrictions on
75. See infra Section l.A.2.b.
76. See infra Section II.C.
77. Indeed, one of the key modeling improvements that game theory brought to economics is
that a party's decision can depend on its prediction of the consequences of its opponent's response.
Specifically relevant to present purposes: a party's decision regarding what to offer (or accept) in a
bargaining situation can depend on its knowledge that the total surplus to be divided-the proverbial
"size of the pie"-will decrease imminently, if no deal is reached in the present round of negotia-
tions. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97, 98-
99 (1982) (modeling parties' offer/acceptance strategies in "declining pie" negotiation game);
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 68-71 (1992) (same).
78. Miller, supra note 20. A Westlaw KeyCite for 105 HVLR 427 showed 267 citations to




settlement confidentiality, opining that their effects would include "reducing
the frequency of settlement or delaying the stage in the litigation at which
settlement is achieved."7 9 Other commentators have cited this "delaying the
stage" language from Miller s° or opined similarly that requiring more dis-
closure would delay settlement.81
This Article's analysis, however, yields a conclusion contrary to
Miller's: banning confidentiality would accelerate, not delay, the stage at
which many settlements occur-but the extent of this effect should not be
exaggerated. As discussed above, a postfiling-only confidentiality ban
would lead to better early offers from defendants and therefore more prefil-
ing confidential settlements. Availability of prefiling confidentiality would
undercut some of the disclosure benefits of a ban, but not all of the benefits,
for two reasons. First, to alert the public to certain hazards, it is not neces-
sary to disclose all settlements, just to disclose enough for word to reach
public agencies, consumer advocates, and lawyers considering investigating
the hazards in question. Second, even if defendants are incentivized to offer
prefiling settlements, not all cases can settle before filing. It is hard for a
defendant to distinguish good from bad cases so early in a dispute, before
the parties exchange information in discovery and test each other's positions
with dueling motions. After all, pre-trial litigation is the basic process that
normally leads to settlement by both distinguishing good from bad and
causing the parties' expectations to converge. Before filing, if defendants
cannot tell which cases merit large versus small settlement offers (and there-
fore must make similar offers to varied plaintiffs), this "pooling" of strong
and weak cases82 prevents defendants from settling as much as they would
like: "strong case" plaintiffs would not accept small prefiling offers, and
defendants could not afford to offer all plaintiffs, strong and weak alike,
enough to satisfy the "strong" ones. Thus, even defendants strongly desiring
confidentiality cannot count on being able to settle prefiling; certainly more
cases will settle prefiling at the margins, but the increased incentive to settle
early cannot overcome all the traditional reasons that not all cases can settle
early.
79. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
80. E.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 333 n.363 (1998) (quoting Miller's language on delaying settlement).
81. E.g., Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation: Safe-
guard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REv. 771, 835 (1990) ("When parties can no longer rely upon
protective orders as a tool to facilitate full and complete disclosure of relevant confidential informa-
tion, the settlement of cases will be delayed or prevented .... ").
82. BONE, supra note 27, at 59-60 (defining "pooling" and applying it to the problem of
frivolous lawsuits: "If the defendant could distinguish the two types, he would treat meritorious




b. Litigation Cost Savings from Accelerated Settlement
Having more prefiling settlements would yield a key benefit, an unin-
tended positive consequence of a ban's inability to reach prefiling
settlements: early settlements save more litigation costs than later settle-
ments. This militates in favor of a policy that (like a confidentiality ban)
encourages earlier settlement. Prefiling settlements actually save all litiga-
tion costs" (CP+C,) whereas a postfiling settlement saves only some fraction
(r) of litigation costs, i.e., r(Cp+CD). Thus, the beneficial economic effect of
a non-confidentiality regime (encouraging earlier, prefiling settlements)




S = number of prefiling settlements induced by a non-confidentiality
regime
S,, = number postfiling settlements deterred by a non-confidentiality
regime
r = average percent of litigation costs left when postfiling settlements
occur
For example, assume that r='/3 (i.e., the average postfiling settlement
occurs when only one-third of litigation costs remain to be spent).8 In that
case, non-confidentiality would increase the litigation cost savings of
settlements, so long as the number of prefiling settlements that non-
confidentiality encourages is more than one-third the number of postfiling
5settlements it deters. In short, a prefiling settlement saves more than a
postfiling settlement in a given case, so to achieve a net savings of litigation
costs, a non-confidentiality regime need not induce as many prefiling
settlements as the number of postfiling settlements it deters.
83. In reality, parties typically incur some legal fees before formal litigation, e.g., pre-litigation
administrative filings and negotiations. See Outten et al., supra note 63 (detailing pre-litigation legal
efforts). The fact remains, however, that by far the largest share of costs comes in actual litigation.
84. There is reason to think that postfiling settlements occur after the parties already have
spent a good deal of their litigation costs. After the end of pretrial discovery is a typical point at
which cases settle, according to both plaintiff- and defense-side attorneys. E.g., Robert Haig, Corpo-
rate Counsel's Guide: Legal Development Report on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate
Litigation, 610 PRAC. L. INST. (LITIG.) 177 (1999) (defendant-side attorney so noting); William S.
Lerach, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995--12 Years Later, 1005 PRAC. L. INST.
(CORP.). 569 (1997) (plaintiff-side attorney so noting). According to one major study, the discovery
process (which comes after the parties spend time on pleadings and any dismissal motions) takes up
about half of litigation costs. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 15 (1997). Thus, typically parties will have spent more
than half their litigation costs by the time they reach a pretrial but post-discovery settlement.
85. This example assumes that settling cases would entail, if they had not settled, litigation
costs similar to those of the cases that do not settle. If settling cases typically are the sort that would
have entailed lower litigation costs, then confidentiality would save litigation costs only if it encour-




Early settlements may be less efficient in two critical ways, however.
First, settlements may start to occur too early, before the parties learn key
facts about each others' legal positions, then the settlement amount may be
an inaccurate estimate of the claim's expected value-and therefore an inac-
curate result in terms of apportioning legal responsibility where it is and is
not deserved.8s Inaccurately estimated settlements inefficiently set the de-
fendant's liability higher or lower than is optimal for deterrence and
compensation purposes, the twin goals of civil liability.87 Too-low liability
leaves defendants insufficiently incentivized to consider the harms they
cause; too-high liability overdeters defendants' activities. 8 To the extent that
a ban induces parties to "jump the gun" and settle before they know enough
to estimate expected liability accurately, a confidentiality ban may make
settlements less efficient.
Second, increasing defendants' incentives to settle early would induce
defendants to expend more prefiling legal and administrative costs on the
following types of measures: more extensive and elaborate investigations,
both internal investigations and investigations of individual plaintiffs; legal
research; internal meetings, which can be disruptive and costly in terms of
lost productive time; and settlement efforts in the form of expensive formal
mediation rather than simple bilateral negotiation. These increased prelitiga-
tion costs could offset some of the saved litigation costs, but certainly not all
of those costs, given how expensive actual litigation is compared to even the
most elaborate prefiling efforts.
In response to both of these potential problems with "too early" settle-
ments-inaccurate early settlements and increased early expenses geared
toward settlement-there is reason to think that many settlements currently
occur too late in the litigation process, later than the point at which the par-
ties know enough to estimate expected value with enough accuracy to settle.
If so, then a policy (like a confidentiality ban) that induces earlier settle-
ment, and earlier investment in settlement efforts, might not be accelerating
settlement to a point too early in litigation.
There are three key reasons that settlements currently occur later than
necessary. First, mutual optimism often prevents early settlement, whenever
the parties' combined litigation costs, their incentive to settle, are less than
the divergence in the parties' EV expectations, their disincentive to settle. 89
Second, attorneys' own incentives, as distinct from their clients', may
lead them to postpone settlement. Attorneys paid by the hour may have a
troubling self-interested incentive: to bill as many hours as possible before
86. See BONE, supra note 27, at 210 ("Settlements based on a full factual record are more
likely to reflect accurate trial outcomes and correspond more closely to the substantive law.").
87. See POLINSKY, supra note 27, at 24-26 (noting, for example, that with liability set too low, a
defendant will undertake a greater-than-efficient amount of the activity that harms the plaintiff).
88. See id.
89. See supra Section I.A.2.
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settling, not to settle as early as is feasible.90 At least at the margins, an
hourly-paid attorney considering settlement may give in to the temptation,
conscious or not, to litigate a bit more before seriously exploring settle-
ment.9' This divergence between the interests of the principal (the client) and
the agent (the hourly-paid attorney) 92 would tend to delay settlement unnec-
essarily.
Third, even if parties settle at a point appropriate in light of their own
litigation costs, they still tend to settle later than is efficient, because they do
not consider the costs of judicial administration. As discussed above, parties
settle when the remaining litigation costs exceed the difference in their es-
timates of the case's expected value.93 Even if the parties accurately estimate
their own litigation costs, however, they have no incentive to consider judi-
cial administration costs, such as the costs of running a courthouse and
employing the judge and courthouse staff. At the margins, some parties will
deem it not quite worth settling to save their litigation costs even though
they would deem it worth settling if they had to consider the judicial ad-
ministration costs their litigation imposes. Thus, parties have an incentive to
settle later than is efficient because they externalize part of the cost of litiga-
tion onto the public; this is a negative externality of litigation that makes
parties over-utilize the courts and under-utilize settlement, even if they accu-
rately assess all costs, benefits, and probabilities.
Accordingly, early settlements are more efficient in terms of saving liti-
gation costs, and it is unclear whether they would accelerate settlement to a
point too early for the parties to estimate liability accurately. Currently, there
is reason to think that settlement occurs later than necessary, so accelerating
settlement would save litigation costs while possibly not sacrificing settle-
ment accuracy--depending, of course, on the exact extent of the current
"delayed settlements" problem, and on the degree to which a confidentiality
ban accelerates settlement.
Yet the big picture is even more indeterminate. The net effect on settle-
ment of banning confidentiality is not the clear "less settlement" effect that
traditional economic analysis posits. There are two competing effects, and it
is unclear which dominates, (a) defendants' greater willingness to make set-
tlement offers prefiling (a positive change possibly lessened if earlier
settlements are less accurate) or (b) defendants' lesser willingness to make
90. BONE, supra note 27, at 98-100 (noting concern that attorneys "will reject or delay set-
tlement in order to run up billable hours").
91. See id. at 99. Of course, whereas most defendants' lawyers are paid on an hourly basis,
many plaintiffs' lawyers are paid a contingency fee (a percentage of the verdict or settlement). A
contingency fee incentivizes plaintiffs' lawyers to settle earlier, not later, in the litigation. Id. at 101.
It takes two sides to settle, and defendants' lawyers' incentive to delay settlement is exacerbated by
plaintiffs' eagerness to settle, because that eagerness would induce a rational defendant to lower its
settlement offer. Id. The defendant's lower offer would further delay settlement. See id.
92. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 25, at 608-09 (defining "principal-agent prob-
lem" and explaining how it results from asymmetric information: the agent knows more about its
own work than the principal does, so the agent can serve its own interests at the expense of the
principal's).
93. See supra Section I.A. 1.
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settlement offers postfiling. As a practical matter, in some cases, and with
some parties, one effect may dominate the other.
Despite the presence of competing incentives with a murky net effect,
two clear conclusions can be drawn from this Section's analysis. First, this
analysis undercuts the traditional economic diagnosis that banning confiden-
tiality both decreases defendants' willingness to settle and increases
litigation costs. Second, encouraging of prefiling settlements is a promising
benefit of banning confidentiality that has gone substantially unnoticed by
the existing literature.
3. The Broader Phenomenon: Insufficiently Comprehensive
Regulation Producing Unintuitively Skewed Effects
As discussed above, any ban on confidential settlements would have a
systematic "gap": it would not reach prefiling settlements. That gap is the
cause of the unintuitive conclusion that banning settlement confidentiality
would encourage prefiling settlements. This is an example of a broader phe-
nomenon: when regulations have systematic "gaps" in their enforceability,
parties are incentivized to shift their activity into that gap, which can make
the regulation have results unintuitively opposite those intended. Other ex-
amples of this phenomenon have been noted elsewhere:
Banning employment discrimination may increase discrimination in
hiring. Hiring discrimination is harder to catch than firing or on-the-job
discrimination such as unequal pay or harassment, so (1) hiring women
or minorities may increase employers' risk of discrimination suits,
whereas (2) hiring fewer "protected class" workers (i.e., discriminating
in hiring) may, perversely, decrease employers' risk.94
Workplace accommodation mandates (such as disability accommoda-
tions, 95 family/medical leave, 96 or pregnancy leave 97) may backfire,
harming the intended beneficiaries. Employers forced to accommodate
certain workers are incentivized either to pay those workers less or to
avoid hiring them: if it is harder to police wage discrimination, the dis-
crimination will be in lower wages; if it is harder to police hiring
discrimination, employers will discriminate in hiring. Either way, if the
discrimination laws have a "gap," with either wage or hiring equity less
enforceable than accommodation mandates, then accommodation man-
dates may increase discrimination.98
A safety regulation can decrease safety if it is insufficiently compre-
hensive. Holding a manufacturer liable for injuries its product causes
can lead to more injuries if increased liability raises prices and thereby
94. Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference for Both
Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of the Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 72 (2004).
95. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
96. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
97. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
98. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REv. 223, 255-56 (2000).
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shifts demand away from the product and toward less safe "off-system
alternatives." For instance, if the price of produce jumps due to liability
for pesticides, consumers may shift to cheap processed snack foods that
may be less healthy than even pesticide-drenched produce. 99
These examples show that, usually, a gap in the enforceability of a rule
is a troubling thing; shifting activity into less effectively regulated areas can
worsen the problem the regulation had targeted. However, the gap in the
enforceability of a confidentiality ban-its inability to reach prefiling set-
tlements effectively-is not so clearly a bad thing. To be sure, the gap is a
loophole allowing some secrecy to remain, which to some extent subverts
the ban. But this gap has benefits too, in that it could mitigate the key nega-
tive effect of a ban: (1) by encouraging prefiling settlement, it would
mitigate a ban's anti-settlement effects; and (2) by inducing earlier (prefil-
ing) settlements, it would save litigation costs, mitigating the concern that a
ban would increase litigation costs by leaving dockets clogged and inducing
more litigation. Accordingly, the gap in the enforceability of a confidential-
ity ban, far from a wholly unfortunate loophole, is at least in part a happy
accident that saves the regulation from its worst potential qualities: deterring
settlements and increasing litigation costs.
B. Low-Value vs. High-Value Cases: Settlement Incentives
Varying Based on the Value of the Case
As discussed above, contrary to the analyses of the existing literature,
banning confidentiality of settlements would have a dual effect: increasing
parties' incentives to settle before the complaint filing, but decreasing their
incentives to settle after filing. The existing literature also fails to note that
the strength of these incentive effects will vary based on the monetary value
(the EV) of the lawsuit-but that variation traces to multiple complex fac-
tors, making it hard to predict whether the effects will be stronger for high-
or low-EV lawsuits.
In the traditional model, the incentive effects of a confidentiality ban are
strongest in high-EV suits: banning confidentiality would affect settlement
of high-EV cases more than of low-EV cases.'00 However, the reality is far
more complicated and far less predictable. This Section illustrates how mis-
leading the traditional view's simpler conclusion can be.
The dual effect of banning confidentiality-more prefiling settlements,
fewer postfiling settlements-exists because the settlement range (S) con-
sists of not only monetary cost (SM=CP+CD, the litigation costs that
settlements save), but also reputational cost (SR=pLR, the reputational cost of
a plaintiff's verdict that a settlement saves the defendant). It is the
99. See infra Section II.D.2.
100. See supra Section I.B (noting that the way banning confidentiality decreases settlement
is by eliminating the reputational part of the settlement range (pLR), an impact that is greatest when
the claim is meritorious (when p is high) and when the alleged injury is substantial (when L. is high,
which will tend to be in high-level injury and damages cases)-that is, in high-value cases).
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reputational cost's presence prefiling, coupled with its absence postfiling,
that encourages prefiling settlement but discourages postfiling settlement. A
confidentiality ban eliminates SR (i.e., a settlement no longer would save
reputational costs), so the question is, how significant a portion of the set-
tlement range (S) is reputational cost (SR)? Perhaps most of the settlement
range is monetary (SM), i.e., parties are motivated mainly by litigation cost
savings, with reputational concerns secondary; or perhaps reputational costs
(SR) are the more significant inducement to settle.
This Section will illustrate a previously unnoticed point about the effects
of banning confidentiality: the relative sizes of the monetary (SM) and repu-
tational (SR) components of the settlement range will depend on the
lawsuit's EV. This means that the effect of banning confidentiality will differ
for large and small lawsuits. The question is, which rises more rapidly as
the EV of a suit rises, the monetary component (SM) or the reputational com-
ponent (SR) of the settlement range? The graphs below depict the question




-0- EV -U1--SM -- A-- SR to
If the reputational element (SR) rises more rapidly than the monetary
element (SM), then for high-EV suits, SR will be more important than SM
compared to their significance in low-EV suits; the dual incentive effects of
a confidentiality ban will be stronger in high-EV suits. In contrast, if the
monetary component rises more rapidly, then for high-EV suits SM domi-
nates SR; the effects of a confidentiality ban will be weaker in high-EV suits
than low-EV suits.
The EV of a lawsuit is pLM, so to examine what happens to the monetary
(SM) and reputational (SR) components of the settlement range as EV rises,
we must examine what happens to SR and SM: (1) as p rises (i.e., as the like-
lihood of the plaintiff prevailing rises), and (2) as LM rises (i.e., as the
monetary stakes rise). The first question-what happens to SR and SM as p
rises-is the easier one, but nevertheless there is no obvious answer. The
101. Both graphs assume that SM (the sum of the parties' litigation costs) rises more slowly
than EV does, an assumption explained below. Thus, the key difference between the two graphs is
whether SR rises more or less rapidly than EV does.
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second question is far more complex; the answer is that there is a multifac-
eted relationship between EV and the strength of the effects of banning
confidentiality, but that relationship is complex and unpredictable. Thus, it
seems likely that banning confidentiality would have different effects on
high-EV and low-EV suits, but it is difficult to predict which type of suit
would be more strongly affected, contrary to the traditional model's clear
but oversimplified prediction.
(1) What happens to SR and SM as p rises?
Because SR=pLR, we know that SR rises proportionately as p rises. In
contrast, SM=Cp+CD, so SM does not appear to rise at all as p rises,' 2 but that
appearance may be misleading. As EV rises, parties spend more on litiga-
tion (i.e., CP and CD may rise), because with higher stakes, there are higher
returns on the "investment" of litigation costs.'0 3 Accordingly, SM likely does
rise as p rises (because higher p means more litigation spending), but proba-
bly not proportionately, because of limits at both extremes, as explained
below.
For high-EV cases, there is a limit to how much more attorney time one
can spend on litigation. For example, the federal rules presumptively limit
the number and duration of depositions to ten seven-hour days; °4 and once a
summary judgment or other motion is well-researched and polished to a
certain level, it cannot get much better. For low-EV cases, certain litigation
costs cannot be eliminated or cut meaningfully past a certain point. For ex-
ample, the time spent at certain mandatory court appearances may not vary
at all based on the merits of the case; basic client meetings and phone calls
can vary in length but have some minimum; and the time spent on certain
filings, such as motion papers or mandatory pretrial papers like jury instruc-
tions, cannot be cut to zero.
In short, as p goes from (for example) 0.20 to 0.10 and then to 0.05, liti-
gation costs typically cannot be halved, and then halved again (and the same
goes for increases in p). On the whole, as the probability of a plaintiff's vic-
tory (p) rises, litigation costs likely do rise, but less rapidly than the rise in
p, so SR rises more rapidly than SM Consequently, as the probability of a
102. Formally (for those trained in basic calculus):
: (PLRa(p) =LR and
)(SM (p) - (CP + CD 0(p) = 0.
103. See, e.g., BONE, supra note 27, at 217 (providing an example of how parties' discovery
spending rises as the amount of potential liability rises).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 30. Courts may extend the limit beyond ten deposition days in large
cases, id., but not always, and certainly not proportionately to the dollar value of a case. For exam-
ple, in a multi-million dollar case, the stakes may be fifty times as large as in the average federal




plaintiff's victory rises, the reputational motivation to settle (SR) increases in
importance compared to the monetary motivation, SM. Because banning con-
fidentiality is an elimination of SR, the effects of such a ban would be
stronger in high-p cases, in which S, is more significant, than in low-p
cases, in which SR is less significant. As discussed below, however, we can-
not as plausibly predict the effects of a rise in LM, the monetary stakes, on
the relative sizes of SR and SM.
(2) What happens to SR and SM as LM rises?
The second question-what happens to the relative sizes of SR and SM as
LM (the monetary stakes) rises-is much more difficult to answer. As dis-
cussed above, when EV rises, litigation costs often do rise, but at a declining
rate, so as LM rises, SM rises as well, but less than proportionally.
What happens to SR as LM rises is the trickier question. Because S, is
pLR, the question is what happens to pLR as LM rises. The p factor of pLR is
irrelevant, because there is no relationship between p and LM; i.e., there is no
reason to think that big-money cases are more meritorious than small-
money cases. Therefore, the question really is what happens to LR as LM
rises; i.e., as the size of a public verdict or settlement (LM) increases, how
much more reputational cost (LR) does that verdict impose? It is safe to as-
sume that LR does in fact rise as LM rises, because big verdicts are more
embarrassing to defendants than small ones, but the question is, how rap-
idly? The answer depends on the assumptions made, and here it is hard to
declare one assumption more well-founded than another.
On the one hand, it seems likely that as LM rises, LR rises at a declining
rate, just like SM, the litigation costs. For example, four $50,000 verdicts
could, other things equal, impose more reputational cost than one $200,000
verdict, perhaps by indicating that this particular defendant (a) gets sued
frequently and presumably is likely to have actually done something wrong,
like a doctor sued frequently for malpractice or (b) is quick to settle and for
that reason seems an "easy mark" for plaintiffs.' °5 A doctor might be a good
example of a defendant who would fear one $200,000 verdict less than four
$50,000 verdicts. The sheer number of malpractice lawsuits against the doc-
tor might be relevant to the doctor's reputation, even apart from the total
amount he or she pays in liability. That is, $200,000 in one lawsuit against a
doctor may not harm the doctor's reputation as much as $200,000 in four
lawsuits against that doctor. To the extent that this example is an accurate
characterization of many defendants, then as LM increases by a multiple of
four (from $50,000 to $200,000), LR increases by less than four times.
'06
105. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (recounting these harms to defendants
from disclosures of prior settlements).
106. The same would be true for other multiples than four, of course. Formally:
((L a d 2(L R0XaLM ) > 0 an  (L M)2 < 0
[Vol. 105:867
Illuminating Secrecy
On the other hand, it is possible that as LM rises, LR rises at an increas-
ing rate, at least once LM gets high enough, for two reasons. First, perhaps
small verdicts or settlements convey little or no information about a defen-
dant's culpability (only that some minor or frivolous lawsuits succeed to
some extent), whereas "[v]ery large settlements ... might suggest that the
defendant was guilty," as would large verdicts.' 7 Second, even if numerous
verdicts of, say, $50,000 might be more informative than one $200,000 ver-
dict (as to both whether the defendant breaks the law and how willing the
defendant is to settle), the one big verdict could draw much more unwanted
attention. Behavioral economists have noted that unusual news, such as an
unusually large verdict, is more salient to readers and therefore draws dis-
proportionate attention, even to the point of skewing readers' perceptions.
This bias in perception leads people to overestimate the likelihood of large
verdicts, plane crashes, or other freak events that draw disproportionate pub-
lic attention.' 8
Consequently, we cannot really say whether, as LM rises, LR rises at an
increasing or decreasing rate. The answer may well be "both," in two ways.
First, perhaps defendants' reputational concerns vary: some industries or
individual companies may be most fearful of many small frivolous suits (in
which case LR would not rise as much as L,); but others may fear mainly the
large, ruinous suit (in which case LR would be very low for a low LM but
would increase rapidly as LM rises).
Second, perhaps as LM increases, LR rises initially at a decreasing rate,
but then at an increasing rate because at very high levels of LM, "big cases"
draw disproportionate attention. Each of these two possible explanations
means that the relationship between LR and LM is quite complex. In the first
explanation, any model of LR and LM would need a separate variable for
each industry, or each defendant "type," with different reputational con-
cerns. In the second explanation, an appropriate model of LR and LM would
feature an "inflection point" at which the rate of increase of LR would accel-
erate dramatically. Either way, such a complex relationship between L, and
LM makes it difficult not only to choose realistic assumptions, but also to
undertake any empirical modeling.' And either way, what little the
107. Lothes, supra note 26, at 462.
108. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 43, at 1518-19 (explaining how people
make inaccurate probability estimates based on two cognitive errors: (1) the "availability" heuris-
tic-that "judgments about probabilities will often be affected by ... how easily such instances
come to mind," so policy is "driven by recent and memorable instances of harm" and (2) the "sali-
ence" heuristic-that people give greater weight to emotionally striking news such as asbestos in
schools than to more serious everyday risks like as "poor diet and exercise"); STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 35-36 (1993) (noting that
people "react more strongly, and give greater importance, to events that stand out from the back-
ground," and recounting evidence that the media give such events disproportionate coverage).
109. The more variables are included in a statistical model, the less precise and reliable the
model becomes. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 60, 61 n.13 (2d ed. 1988) (ex-
plaining that standard error, "[a] measure of 'reliability' or precision" of the estimators a regression
analysis yields, increases (i.e., there is less reliability and precision) with "the number of degrees of
freedoml:] ... the total number of observations in the sample ... less the number of... constraints
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traditional model has to say about confidentiality's incentive effects on high-
versus low-EV suits is oversimplified to the point of being incomplete and
incorrect.
C. More Information on Settlement Values: Decreased Uncertainty
Leading to More Early Settlements and Less Frivolous Litigation
1. Less Divergence in Parties' Initial Beliefs
A key reason that parties often have divergent beliefs as to the claim's ex-
pected value is that their initial information is incomplete,"0 and sometimes
asymmetric, such as when a single defendant knows about the claims of nu-
merous unrelated plaintiffs who are unaware of each other.' The more
incomplete the parties' information, the greater the possible divergence, and
the less likely that the parties settle; the more complete their information, the
lesser the possible divergence, and the more likely that the parties settle. " '
A ban on confidentiality would make more settlements public compared
with the status quo, in which virtually all are confidential."3 One noted anti-
confidentiality argument is that disclosure "alerts future plaintiffs with
credible cases, thus increasing the fraction of viable suits and promoting...
compensation and deterrence."' 14 The pro-confidentiality counterargument is
that disclosure would promote more nuisance suits than credible cases.'15
Much less discussed in the literature is the extent to which more settle-
ment disclosure would facilitate settlement by helping even plaintiffs who
already know they have claims, and the defendants who face them better
estimate the value of those claims. When more settlements are public, other
attorneys and parties can make better estimates of the settlement values of
their own claims, because they can see the settlement amounts-the "pL"
estimates-in prior similar cases.' 6 No one prior settlement is likely to be
an exact precedent, of course, because individual cases vary as much as
snowflakes. Among employment lawsuits, for example, plaintiffs each have
or restrictions put on them," indicating that regressions become less precise, even less feasible, as
more variables (e.g., types of defendants) must be incorporated into an economic model).
110. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
111. Daughety & Reinganum, Hush money, supra note 23, at 664 (noting that in evaluating
settlement confidentiality, one relevant model is that "a sequence of uninformed plaintiffs makes
settlement demands of an informed defendant whose culpability in the... cases is correlated").
112. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
114. Lothes, supra note 26, at 457; see also Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 16, at 592
("The disposition of P1's suit is likely to affect the probability that P2 makes the connection be-
tween her injury and D's activity.").
115. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 54.
116. E.g., POSNER, supra note 27, at 570 (noting that widespread confidentiality hurts later
plaintiffs by denying them information on settlement values); Miller, supra note 20, at 485 n.286
("Those contemplating or involved in similar litigation obviously would have a great interest in the
terms of [another party's] settlement.").
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unique work histories and job qualifications; the employee and the em-
ployer's decision-makers each have unique personal qualities; and
employers vary as to a host of workplace details (e.g., anti-discrimination
procedures).'
But while no case will settle merely based on the settlement amount of a
prior similar case, certainly a range of "prior comparables" can provide a
ballpark range of settlement values, just as houses are unique but any legal
assessment of a house's value commonly looks to the prices of "compara-
ble" properties, even if no one other property truly is that similar."" It would
at least be informative for parties in an employment dispute to know the
settlements reached by prior employees in similar jobs with similar claims
against similar employers. Various court filings, including the typical federal
court complaint,"9 likely contain these and more details about the employee,
the employer, and the legal claims at issue.
Public disclosure of settlement amounts could narrow the range of dis-
agreement among the parties by dissuading them from making extreme
settlement offers. Even if settlements of similar claims have varied by a fac-
tor of ten-for instance, if various female stockbrokers' discrimination
claims settled for anywhere from $50,000 and $500,000-that data would
make it harder, in a later such lawsuit, for the defendant to stick to a "nui-
sance-value" offer (such as $5,000) ' and for a plaintiff to demand a
117. E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000) (holding
that, in discrimination case, "[w]hether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular
case will depend on a number of factors .. . [such as] the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case,
the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that
supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered...."); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
... proof required.., is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.").
118. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Assessor of Geddes, 699 N.E.2d 899, 900
(N.Y. 1998) (reversing a lower court holding that held that it is inappropriate to value "specialty"
properties through the use of a comparable sales method); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Kier-
nan, 366 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1977) ( "[Flacilities such as utility tunnels, employee walkways,
truck loading docks, refrigeration facilities or the like do not render the subject property a specialty
incapable of valuation according to the normal market value method.").
119. Even in the rare cases in which courts seal settlement filings, the plaintiff's complaint is
sealed only three percent of the time. See REAGAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1.
120. See, e.g., Complaint, Mansfield v. Billington, 432 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.D.C. 2006) (No.
05CV01790), 2005 WL 2861435 (federal court complaint by middle-management federal govem-
ment employee with roughly twenty-five years of tenure alleging (1) Equal Pay Act and Title VII
claims of sex discrimination in compensation, in that she performed the same work as men in a
higher pay grade but was classified at a lower pay grade; and (2) that she suffered a retaliatory de-
motion after she complained about the pay discrimination); Complaint, Taylor v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 421 F Supp. 2d 946 (W.D. La. 2006) (No. CV 03-0516-S), 2003 WL 23768755 (federal
court complaint by African American male UPS official with roughly twenty-seven years of tenure
alleging racially discriminatory denials of equal compensation and of deserved promotions to "divi-
sion manager" and higher positions repeatedly over at least ten years).
These pleadings contained a good deal more detail, but the point is that merely scanning the
basic details of a filed complaint can be very helpful for a would-be plaintiff (or, more likely, her
attorney) seeking to find comparable cases.
121. See, e.g., Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F.3d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying two
police brutality plaintiffs any attorneys' fees as "prevailing parties," because settlements of $2,500
and $5,000 were settlements defendant made merely to avoid the "nuisance" of the lawsuits). "A
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million-dollar settlement. It is a common strategy among litigators to agree
to a serious settlement effort, such as formal mediation, only after the other
side makes a credible settlement offer.121 Whereas the conventional wisdom
is that more data on cases' settlement values would encourage more litiga-
tion, '23 this analysis shows how it could advance and accelerate settlement of
filed cases.
2. Less Incentive to File Negative-Value Suits
There is another, less intuitive benefit of the greater public information
yielded by a confidentiality ban: as noted in a recent groundbreaking paper,
"increased uncertainty in the litigation process will generate a greater incen-
tive to file more undesirable lawsuits," specifically more lawsuits with a
"negative expected value" ("NEV") in the sense that the litigation costs out-
strip the potential benefits to the plaintiff. 24 This is exactly contrary to one
frequently cited pro-confidentiality argument: that more disclosure will gen-
erate more frivolous litigation.
12
1
Why plaintiffs ever would file NEV suits is an economic riddle that
has many possible answers. 1 6 Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang add a
new answer by analyzing litigation and settlement decisions based on "real
options theory."'' 27 One of "the tools applied to the economic analysis of
research and development projects," real options theory models litigation
"as a series of decision points" :12 significant case developments (e.g., key
testimony or rulings) yield information that makes parties adjust their
strategies, perhaps the plaintiff abandoning the case or the defendant rais-
ing its settlement offer.
29
compromise for less than the costs of defense is a good working definition of a nuisance-value set-
tlement, unless ... the stakes of the case are themselves small." Id.
122. This was the author's own strategy in employment law practice, and it is common advice
for litigators, both plaintiff- and defendant-side. See, e.g., H. Thomas Fehn, et. al., Securities Arbi-
tration Mediator Model SA-/(rn)(f)--User's Manual, 1383 PRAC. L. INST. (CORP.) 371 (2003)
(offering this advice for fellow defense attorneys); Brian N. Smiley & Steven J. Gard, A Message to
Mediators, 1503 PRAC. L. INST. (CORP.) 435, 439 (2005) (offering this advice for fellow plaintiffs'
attorneys). Smiley and Gard further explain this advice as follows:
[W]e do not want to go into the mediation only to learn that the other side has not yet given se-
rious thought to the settlement value .... If they in fact perceive this as a "cost of defense"
case, we see little reason to educate them about the merits prior to the hearing ... [and] no
need for either party to incur the expense of a mediator....
Id.
123. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
124. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28, at 1316.
125. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 52.
127. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28.
128. Id. at 1270, 1273.
129. Id. at 1279.
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Viewing lawsuits as a series of decision points, Grundfest and Huang
observe that a plaintiff may rationally pursue an NEV claim by investing
only a portion of the litigation costs in some initial stages of the dispute,
such as filing a court complaint and taking some minimal discovery (or just
filing a prelawsuit administrative complaint'°) in the hopes that these lim-
ited steps yield either useful information or a quick settlement."' If this
limited investment does not produce any useful information or settlement,
the plaintiff can abandon the claim after spending a small amount. In this
sense, filing a case is "buying an option" to litigate, allowing the plaintiff to
wait to see if a weak claim improves due to some unexpected development:
a defendant proving especially antsy to settle; limited discovery unearthing a
smoking gun; a surprising judicial decision favoring the plaintiff; or even• • 132
just drawing an unusually pro-plaintiff judge. In short, if the plaintiff sees
sufficient uncertainty about such matters, including uncertainty as to what
the defendant would pay, then it may be worth at least a limited effort to
pursue a claim that initially appears to have a negative value.
This theory explains how a plaintiff's lawyer may pursue a number of
NEV claims tentatively, through some initial litigation stages, and then
abandon most but continue with the few that enjoy some surprising good
news in the initial stages. If most claims that appear to be NEV prove worth-
less, but a few turn out after limited expenditure to have a high payoff, then
investing in many NEV suits may be a profitable strategy. Undertaking an
NEV claim thus is like buying an option currently worth little: it will likely
prove worthless, but there is a small chance that changed circumstances will
make it valuable, so it may be rational to purchase many such cheap low-
value options, that is, to file many NEV suits, invest little in the early stages
of each, and see which proves to be a winner.
133
The fact that pursuing NEV claims is a winning strategy only if a few
prove to be big winners "suggests that 'riskier' lawsuits can be more valu-
able to ... plaintiffs than 'safer' lawsuits if the plaintiff is able to reduce or
eliminate his litigation expenditures sufficiently in the event the lawsuit
evolves poorly."' 34 "Riskier" lawsuits here means "that the lawsuit's variance
is sufficiently high," most notably if most are of zero or negative value while
130. For example, most federal employment discrimination complaints must be preceded by
an administrative filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which has at least
180 days (more if the complainant consents) to investigate and reach a nonbinding conclusion on the
merits of the complaint. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) to -(f)
(2000). Cooperating with this 180-day investigation-to-ruling process can be a low-cost initial in-
vestment in a legal claim.
131. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28, at 1277.
132. See generally Robert A. Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush's
Judicial Appointees, 88 JUDICATURE 20 (2004) (noting wide variation in percentages of "liberal
decisions" by judges appointed by different presidents, including unintuitive differences among
different types of cases, e.g., criminal cases versus civil rights cases).
133. The author, who before becoming a professor was a practicing plaintiff-side employment
lawyer, knows of attorneys whose plaintiff-side practice involved this sort of "file en masse" tactic.
134. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 28, at 1315.
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a select few are of high value. ' This "suggest[s] ... that uncertainty... [in]
litigation ... provides an incentive for plaintiffs to file a greater-than-
optimal number of lawsuits.'
3 6
Given the link between uncertainty and NEV filings, banning confiden-
tiality could decrease NEV filings by decreasing uncertainty as to the fate of
similar lawsuits, 37 contrary to the pro-confidentiality argument that more
settlement disclosure would increase frivolous litigation. 38 As discussed
earlier, banning confidentiality decreases uncertainty about case value by
clarifying the values of similar prior cases. 3 9 Most settlements, one recent
study has shown, are for relatively modest sums; few settlements reach the
seven-figure, or even high six-figure, '° sums that populate newspaper head-
lines and inspire the greedy among us to dream of becoming plaintiffs. 4'
Thus, one of the information-economics benefits of banning confidentiality
is that more data about settlements will diminish the incentive to file an
NEV lawsuit in the hopes that, after limited expenditures, a case will prove
to be the one that beats the odds and yields a positive value.
Admittedly, it is far from certain that banning confidentiality would, on
the net, decrease frivolous suits. To the extent that a ban increases the pres-
sure on defendants to settle early, more frivolous plaintiffs may get
settlement offers that they do not deserve. Moreover, Epstein and others may
have a point in arguing that, to some extent, disclosed settlements inspire
copycat lawsuits, some of them unmeritorious. The situation is not as bleak
as Epstein depicts, however, because some of the "copycats" are deserving
plaintiffs who simply had not known enough to sue. 4 Epstein's only re-
135. Id. at 1316.
136. Id. at 1322.
137. Grundfest & Huang provide a disclaimer for any inference that uncertainty breeds NEV
filings: increasing uncertainty can mean more or fewer NEV filings, depending on the initial level of
uncertainty. Id. at 1320-21. But they also note that (1) increasing uncertainty is most likely to in-
crease NEV filings when the legal environment already was high in uncertainty; and (2) there is a
great deal of uncertainty inherent in litigation. Id. Litigation very much seems like the sort of high-
uncertainty endeavor in which a plaintiff's lawyer may file what appears to be a NEV suit as a "lot-
tery ticket," in the hopes that after limited litigation cost expenditures, the case will emerge as one
that beats the odds and yields positive value.
138. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
139. See supra Section H.C. I.
140. Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Studty Of Confidential Employment
Discrimination Settlements 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (examining recently dis-
closed data on confidential settlements collected in one judicial district and finding that (1) the
median confidential settlement in an employment discrimination case was $30,000; (2) the median
in personal injury lawsuits was $181,500; and (3) of the 455 discrimination settlements (the largest
group studied), only nine (just under 2%) were above $300,000, and only 1 (0.2%) was above $1
million).
141. Id. at 4 ("[N]ewspaper reports reflected an 85% win rate for plaintiffs with average re-
coveries of $1.1 million, when the docket entries showed a 32% win rate, and a recovery average of
$150,000") (citing Laura Beth Nielson & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: 7itle VII, Print
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 251-
253 (2004)).
142. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 105:867
Illuminating Secrecy
sponse to this is to assert that lawsuits are a bad way to redress even clearly
wrongful conduct, 43 a position that proves too much: if we accept Epstein's
premise that we should junk the entire tort system, then yes, we need not
worry about confidentiality's effects on "worthy" lawsuits, because there is
no such thing-but few would accept Epstein's premise.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that diminished uncertainty about the
range of possible outcomes would dissuade those with low-odds cases from
filing in the first place. If they know that a case is not only low-odds (be-
cause the claim is frivolous) but also unlikely to yield a six-figure damages
award even if the plaintiff wins (the point that more settlement disclosure
would make clear), then few plaintiffs with such claims will choose to pay
lawyers' hourly rates, and even fewer lawyers will take such cases on a con-
tingent fee. At the very least, how a confidentiality ban would impact
frivolous litigation is far less clear, due to the presence of competing effects,
than economic analysts to date have noted.
D. More Information on Settlement Values: Remedying Information
Shortcomings That Induce Sub-Optimal Market Choices
1. Remedying Self-Perpetuating Occupational Segregation
The textbook free-market economic analysis of discrimination is that it
cannot happen much in a reasonably free market. Discrimination is an irra-
tional decision to forego good talent, as in refusing to hire qualified women
or racial minorities, or to treat employees badly regardless of their value,
such as by allowing harassment based on sex or race. Discrimination weak-
ens an employer's existing talent pool, scares off applicants, and dims future
prospects for attracting and retaining talent. Employers that discriminate
lose out to competitors who do not discriminate, or at least forego profits by
tolerating a lesser labor pool.'"
143. See Epstein, supra note 54. Epstein questions the merits of various claims concealed by
confidential settlements (such as claims of defective Firestone tires, when the tires had met "federal
design specifications" and some plaintiffs had engaged in "improper maintenance and egregious
use") but asserts that even as to clear cases of harmful, illegal acts, civil liability is inappropriate:
Everyone must deplore the apparent breakdown in the internal procedures of the Roman
Catholic Church, which failed to remove priests from positions of power for abusive behavior.
But are lawsuits the best way to right these wrongs? ... [Playment of high damages deprives
the Church of money it needs to right itself .... [l]t makes more sense in serious cases to re-
quire that the Church report abusive priests to state officials, who can then take steps to ensure
that offenders are removed from office and then charged with criminal offenses.
Id.
144. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 396-98
(8th ed. 2003) (explaining based on economic model: "[D]iscriminators give up profits in order to
indulge their prejudices .... [I]f competitive forces were at work[,] ... firms that discriminate
would be punished and discrimination could not persist unless their owners were willing to accept
below-market rates of return .... ); see generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMI-
NATION (2d ed. 1971).
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This "discrimination penalty"-the loss of qualified labor-is key to the
argument that free markets exert competitive pressure against discrimina-
tion. The existence of a significant discrimination penalty, however, has
been called into doubt on several fronts. First, discrimination may in fact be
utility-maximizing for employers, both monetarily (even a nonbigoted em-
ployer may cater to racist customers or workers) and nonmonetarily (racist
employers losing utility from interacting with African Americans). 45 Sec-
ond, all employers in a field can lessen the competitive pressure not to
discriminate by making a cartel-like agreement to discriminate, such as an
understanding, among all employers in a certain industry or geographic lo-
cation, that none of them will hire African-Americans. 
46
Third, and most relevant for present purposes, there is substantial doubt
as to whether discriminating employers really lose future talent-that is,
whether allowing discrimination truly hurts recruiting efforts. Discriminat-
ing makes recruitment harder only if potential hires know the firm
discriminates. While discrimination once was overt and obvious, today it is
harder to spot discriminatory employers: modem discrimination is con-
cealed,147 and nondiscriminatory employers may lack women or racial
minorities due to historical chance or past discrimination, not current dis-
crimination. 148
Given this uncertainty as to which employers discriminate, for job appli-
cants from discriminated-against groups, choosing more diverse workplaces
over less diverse ones may be the best way to avoid discriminatory employ-
ers. This is an imperfect way to avoid discrimination, certainly; some
workers, fearing discrimination, will opt against employers who do not ac-
tually discriminate-perhaps they are nondiverse due to random chance or
past discrimination-to the disadvantage of both workers and employers
alike. Workers who opt against truly nondiscriminatory employers are fore-
going otherwise appealing job options; identically, the nondiscriminatory
but nondiverse employer is losing out on talent that could have served it
well.149 Yet it still would be rational, though imperfect, for workers to
145. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAWS 42-47 (1992); see POSNER, supra note 27, at 681-83, 686-88.
146. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 150-56 (1994)
("Discriminatory social groups are much like cartels, and a discriminatory norm is analogous to a
price-fixing agreement .... [Slouthern whites actively used the power of... government to reduce
competition from blacks through the [late nineteenth-century] 'Jim Crow' legislation .... ); Daria
Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 731
(2000); ("[C]oercive social norms and social payoffs ... police discriminatory behavior in racist
cartels.") (citing Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1046-48 (1995)).
147. Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1989) ("'Employers
are rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file that the firing is for a reason
expressly forbidden by law.") (citation omitted); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("The days of Bull Connor are largely past; discrimination now works more subtly.").
148. See Moss, supra note 94, at 35-42 (discussing ways even nondiscriminatory employers
can wind up with large gender gaps).
149. See id. at 59-60 (noting losses both to workers from the discriminated-against group and
to the nondiscriminatory employers they avoid for being nondiverse).
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choose diverse over nondiverse workplaces; given how hard it is to spot dis-
crimination in potential employers, the amount of diversity in a workplace is
a rational proxy for the likelihood of discrimination. 0
This state of affairs-workers choosing diverse workplaces-is an inef-
ficient matching of workers to employers based on an asymmetric
information problem: it is too costly (or impossible) for employees to know
who discriminates; this information cost leads them to substitute imperfect
criteria (level of diversity) that lead to imperfect decision-making. Disturb-
ingly, there is no obvious solution. Nondiscriminatory employers who
happen to be nondiverse cannot fix the situation for various reasons: trum-
peting one's diversity/nondiscrimination programs is cheap talk now that
even the most discriminatory employers feature such programs,", and af-
firmative action is limited by recent judicial decisions.
With more readily available information about which employers dis-
criminate, employees' career decisions would be more efficient.
Confidential settlements worsen this dearth of available information. Minna
Kotkin titled her recent article Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimina-
tion because the problem with settlement confidentiality is that "invisible
settlements make discrimination in the workplace invisible."'5 2 Kotkin spoke
of the purposes and goals of anti-discrimination law, not of information
economics, but much of the problem of discrimination can be viewed as a
problem of economic inefficiency, and confidential settlements are no ex-
ception. By keeping discrimination hidden, confidential settlements keep
information costs high for workers making career decisions, decreasing the
efficiency of those decisions.
Conversely, banning confidentiality would require disclosure of more of
the settlements an employer pays-critical information that could improve
workers' career decisions. While not a perfect measure of discrimination at
the employer, the number and amount of settlements is a far better proxy
than raw percentages of women and minorities in that workplace.'53 Settle-
ment amounts, after all, are based on the parties' estimates of the merits of
the claim: the probability that the plaintiff proves discrimination and the
estimated size of the verdict.
5 4
150. See id. at 27-35.
151. Id. at 26-27, 62-63.
152. Kotkin, supra note 1, at 929.
153. Of course, it makes the most sense for workers to rely on both pieces of information
(settlements as well as diversity percentages). For example, a nondiverse employer (i.e., one with
very few women or minorities) might have fewer discrimination lawsuits than a truly diverse firm of
the same size, even if the nondiverse firm is more discriminatory-which could imply, misleadingly,
that the firm does not discriminate. However, settlement data would remain useful because that
discriminatory non-diverse firm's settlement amounts would be higher, and it would have more
lawsuits per employee of the discriminated-against group. Thus, even though diversity percentages
remain important information, more settlement data still would add value to workers' predictions
about which employers would or would not discriminate.
154. See supra Section L.A (outlining basic "expected value" model of settlement value).
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Thus, while many companies get sued some amount, companies that ac-
tually discriminate more would tend to have (a) more settlements, because
they would tend to have more lawsuits against them,'55 and (b) more large
settlements, because the fact that they truly are "guilty" of discrimination
means that their lawsuits would tend to have higher expected values. The
amounts and sizes of discrimination settlements and verdicts against a com-
pany would be useful information for workers-an imperfect measure of the
amount of discrimination, but better than just looking at the numbers of
women and racial minorities at an employer, which currently is extensively
reported by and about employers.
5 6
2. Remedying the "Second Best" Problem of Tort Liability
The above point (that settlement disclosure could redress an information
shortage that leads to over-avoidance) applies beyond employment markets.
It is also relevant to, for example, investment markets (for instance, inves-
tors avoiding stocks because some companies engage in securities fraud)
and product markets (consumers avoiding certain products because a few
brands are dangerous). This Section discusses one such area, product mar-
kets and tort law, that has seen extensive application of a relevant economic
theory: the theory of second best.
Tort scholars long have noted that consumers may avoid certain prod-
ucts, such as stepladders or fresh fruit with pesticides, because tort liability
increases prices, which decreases the quantity that consumers purchase.
57
Avoiding a "dangerous" product, however, may actually worsen the danger,
by diverting the would-be consumer to more dangerous "off-system alterna-
tives." Customers may wind up standing on folding chairs or eating junk
food, options that are far more dangerous than even imperfectly-designed
stepladders or pesticide-sprayed fresh fruit, respectively."'
This is the "theory of second best," a half-century-old economic
theory' 59 that legal analysts rarely noticed until the past decade or
155. Or, if the company refuses to settle, it would have few settlements but more plaintiff's
verdicts against it, and all such verdicts (regardless of whether settlements can be confidential) are
publicly available. Thus, for a company that discriminates more than others do, refusing to settle is
not an effective way to avoid the bad publicity of public-knowledge settlements.
156. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2006-2007 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL
EMPLOYERS (2006) (providing statistics on gender, race, disability, and sexual orientation at each
major law firm).
157. See Stephen F. Williams, Second-Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort,
106 HARv. L. REV. 932, 934-36 (1993).
158. See id.
159. The leading early article on the theory of second best is R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancas-
ter's The General Theory of Second Best, which summarized it as follows:
[l]f... a constraint ... prevents the attainment of one of the [optimum] Paretian conditions,
the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable ....
[Once] one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation
can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian conditions. The optimum situa-
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two.' 60 In shorthand form, the theory cautions that "well-intentioned tinker-
ing with a quirky, imperfect market can worsen matters ... because efforts
to correct only one market flaw can exacerbate other flaws."' 6' Steven Wil-
liams's application of second best theory sees visibly tort-inflated prices
(which decrease demand) as the problem. 62 But more relevant to the confi-
dential settlements debate is that the invisibility of certain hazards can
worsen the problem.
If it is hard to distinguish between safe and unsafe products of similar
kinds, the lack of information about which particular goods are the "bad
apples" in the bunch exacerbates the basic second-best problem of hazards
shifting demand to worse goods. That is, people switch to more dangerous
off-system alternatives both because some products' prices are inflated by
tort liability161 and because of the information costs of distinguishing be-
tween safe and unsafe products. ' 64 People may avoid a good entirely (for
example, all stepladders, all fresh fruit, or all jobs in an industry with a high
incidence of discrimination) and choose something worse.
Better disclosure of product liability settlements can help consumers
know exactly which brands or types of a good are truly dangerous, espe-
cially to the extent that a large cluster of public settlements would likely
draw media attention (e.g., "Moss Hardware, the nation's leading producer
of home improvement equipment, paid $X million in settlements this past
year on claims of defective ladders"). Notably, "consumers" in this context
includes companies that buy goods such as hardware, tools, or equipment.
Even if it may be unlikely that individual consumers would monitor product
safety in a no-confidentiality regime, it is likely that corporate consumers-
or industry publications, trade associations, or advocacy groups such as
tion finally attained may be termed a second best optimum because it is achieved subject to a
constraint which ... prevents... a Paretian optimum.
R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11
(1956).
160. A Westlaw search (theory s "second best") for law review articles mentioning the theory
found that it was almost never cited in the 1970s (21 articles), more frequently cited in the 1980s
(102 articles), still more frequently cited in the 1990s (332 articles), and apparently is being cited
with still increasing frequency in the 2000s (204 articles in just 2000-2005).
161. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A
Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 197, 218 (1998).
162. See Williams, supra note 157. Williams's application of the theory has been controver-
sial, derided as a "straw man" premised on truly excessive tort liability, see Carl T. Bogus, War on
the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995),
and critiqued as potentially "an all-purpose rhetorical mace against regulation" that "proves [too]
much," Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45
DRAKE L. REV. 361, 367 (1997). At the very least, "a minimalist variant" of the argument-that tort
liability can have these negative substitution effects, Chen & Adams, supra at 367-remains a
worthwhile insight; it is that insight that will be the focus of this Article's discussion of the theory.
163. See Williams, supra note 157.




Consumers Union -would have the incentive, expertise, and resources to
undertake such inquiries. Moreover, even if the average consumer does not
research or monitor many products,' 66 news of major settlements, like news
167 ,161of major verdicts today, would receive enough media airplay to reach a
broad audience.
More generally, better disclosure of settlements can mitigate the prob-
lem of people avoiding a consumer or labor market due to a few bad apples
in that market. In short, when it's easier to spot the bad apples, it's easier to
find and eat good apples.
3. The Benefits of Information Disclosure: A Closer and Broader Look
As discussed above, more settlement disclosure would help consumers
and workers distinguish dangerous products and jobs from less dangerous
ones. This would diminish the problem of those who are under-informed
engaging in "over-avoidance" and shifting to inferior alternatives. These
information benefits of disclosure should not be overstated, however, for
two reasons.
First, more disclosure of product harms could worsen the second-best
problem to some extent, such as consumers abandoning hand drills in favor
of more dangerous off-system alternatives like creative use of sharp objects
to "drill" holes. Second, settlement secrecy does not entirely cover up prod-
uct hazards. Even secret settlements add to product costs, thereby increasing
product prices (depending on the elasticity of demand 69). 170 To the extent
165. The non-profit organization Consumers Union not only publishes Consumer Reports, a
widely read magazine that reports information on a wide range of products, but also publishes more
detailed product comparison and consumer fraud studies, such as Hear This! Consumers Enjoy a
Range of Hearing Aid Options, But Comparison Shopping Can Be Difficult and Access to the
Dream: Home Mortgage Lending in Texas. ConsumersUnion.org, Consumers Union Publications,
http://www.consumersunion.org/aboutcu/publications.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006) (listing stud-
ies conducted by Consumers Union). Such studies and publicity efforts would be facilitated by
better litigation settlement data.
166. The author admits that he knows almost nothing about the contents of his own toolbox,
even though he risks injury, property damage, and embarrassment whenever he uses them.
167. For example, the media have reported extensively on recent settlements and verdicts in
lawsuits alleging deaths resulting from prescription pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, In the
Money and in Court; Drug Industry Braces for New Suits Over Even More of Its Products, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2006, at CI (recounting, on front page of business section, numerous widely re-
ported settlements: "Eli Lilly agreed to spend $700 million to settle 8,000 lawsuits over Zyprexa, a
drug for schizophrenia that causes severe weight gain in many patients. Wyeth has spent $15 billion
... to resolve lawsuits over its fen-phen diet-drug combination, which can cause severe heart prob-
lems .... [A]nalysts estimate that Merck may eventually have to pay $10 billion to $50 billion to
end the litigation over Vioxx, which has been linked to heart attacks and strokes.").
168. See supra note 108 (noting disproportionate reporting of unusual events such as large
verdicts).
169. The extent to which a manufacturer can increase a good's price to recoup liability costs
depends on the elasticity of demand for the product; if consumers can switch easily to other goods,
the manufacturer cannot increase prices without losing sales. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 25, at 52 (noting that the more elastic demand is, the less any changes in supply costs can be
passed along to consumers as price hikes).
170. See generally Williams, supra note 157.
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that the power drill that causes more injuries goes up in price relative to its
safer rivals, then consumers will not over-avoid drills in favor of less safe
off-system alternatives (creative use of sharp objects); they will simply be
guided by the invisible hand to the drills that cost less because they are
safer.
Whether disclosure will worsen or mitigate the second-best problem de-
pends on whether the law can facilitate people's ability to distinguish
hazardous and safe products--or jobs or investments-in the same market
(e.g., different brands of tires, different kinds of power drills, or different
employers in the same industry). To the extent that (1) people are unable to
so distinguish, or there are no meaningful differences among products, and
(2) there are viable off-market alternatives not subject to legal regulation,
then more disclosure could worsen the over-avoidance problem.
There is reason to think, however, that more disclosure can improve
people's ability to distinguish among products. Market prices are imperfect
at reflecting product hazards, because a dangerous product's price is
unlikely to rise enough to reflect the full costs of injuries; the shoddy pro-
duction or neglectful management that caused the hazards may have been
quite cheap, which would make the hazardous goods cheaper, and settle-
ment costs typically fall short of full compensation."' Given the inability of
prices to include all relevant hazard costs, consumers rationally seeking to
avoid injury will tend to avoid all power drills (for example) in a market,
even if only some are dangerous while others are safe, and perhaps only the
safer drills are superior to the off-system alternatives. Better information on
which drills lead to lawsuits can help consumers shift to the safe ones rather
than away from all drills.
More broadly, when a market flaw inhibits efficient decision-making,
mandatory information disclosure can be a useful and quite moderate effort
to remedy that flaw. As to the problem of workers avoiding nondiverse (but
not necessarily discriminatory) workplaces because they inaccurately fear
discrimination there, a drastic solution would be to allow or even require
aggressive affirmative action by such firms. 7 Current law, however, restricts
permissible affirmative action and almost never mandates affirmative action,
except as a remedy for specific evidence of widespread discrimination. 7 1 In
contrast, mandatory settlement disclosure would be a far less drastic meas-
ure, far less burdensome on businesses than traditional "command and
171. Incomplete compensation by the tort system, even by verdicts rather than compromise
settlements, is a reasonable assumption at least in terms of individuals' ex ante decision making,
because people overestimate the negative impact of suffering a loss and underestimate their own
ability to adapt. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behav-
ioural Science Investigation, 24 O.J.L.S. 173, 187-88 (2004) (noting that prisoners' disutility from
imprisonment decreases the longer they stay in prison, because they adapt to that new reality). A full
discussion of whether the tort system compensates accurately, incompletely, or excessively is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
172. See Moss, supra note 94, at 74-76.
173. E.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, 181 F.R.D. 243, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (approving
portion of proposed class action settlement with "set percentage goals for gender diversity in various
job categories," reasoning that such provisions essentially are agreed-upon equitable relief).
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control laws" directly regulating workplace diversity, product safety, or pol-
lution.'7 4 While settlement disclosure would somewhat skew litigation
settlement incentives,'75 it would not have the far more market-altering effect
of, for example, affirmative action, which by its nature directly skews hiring
and promotion decisions.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to move beyond the traditional economic de-
bate about confidential settlements, which largely has been a trite
point/counterpoint: they alleviate courts' overburdened dockets by effi-
ciently facilitating settlement but also impose negative externalities by
leaving dangerous situations undisclosed and unredressed. While economics
by its nature "models" reality by simplifying it, 176 an economic model that
neglects important variables is of little use, because we cannot "assume
away" key realities. As the saying goes, "reality is that which, when you
stop believing in it, doesn't go away."' 77 Specifically, virtually all of the ex-
isting literature misses many of these nuances and complexities of litigation
and settlement:
A confidentiality ban could not effectively reach prelitigation settle-
ments, so it would accelerate settlements; even as this ban discourages
postfiling settlements, it would encourage prefiling settlements.
Accelerating settlements would have mixed effects: earlier settlements
save more litigation costs; on the other hand, settling too early may
mean less accurate liability estimates; on the third hand, parties likely
settle too late now, so earlier settlements may still be advantageous.
A confidentiality ban's effects would vary among high- and low-value
cases, but it is difficult to predict which type would be more affected.
More settlement disclosure could induce more lawsuits, both good and
bad, but by decreasing litigation uncertainty, it also could discourage
frivolous litigation and help parties to litigation settle their own cases.
174. Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the Information Qual-
ity Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 51 (2006) ("Businesses benefit from information disclosure
programs because compliance costs.., are much lower than costs for command and control laws.").
Mandatory disclosure laws have drawn criticism, however, especially in fields like securities that
some deem over-regulated with disclosure rules. See, e.g., Peter Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Financial Regulation: Emotional Impact Analysis 59-61 (June 30, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=870453 (collecting criticisms of mandatory securities disclosure laws). Mandatory disclosure of
settlements would not seem to risk that sort of over-regulation, however, because settlement disclo-
sures would not be nearly as complicated, pervasive, or redundant as securities disclosures;
settlement disclosure could be effectuated with the simple step of requiring the settlement agree-
ment to be filed with the court, just like any other litigation document.
175. See supra Part 11.
176. See BONE, supra note 27, at 15.
177. PHILIP K. DICK, I HOPE I SHALL ARRIVE SOON 4 (1985).
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0 More settlement disclosure could have positive effects beyond the con-
text of litigation, particularly in employment and product markets, by
helping employees, consumers, and investors who might otherwise en-
gage in "over-avoidance" distinguish the good from the bad in the
market.
Given these competing effects, economic analysis cannot offer a clear
prediction of the effects of banning confidentiality. With mere prediction
infeasible, economics certainly cannot make a meaningful prescriptive
judgment about whether a ban would be "good" or "bad."
While the economic view of settlement confidentiality is far more inde-
terminate than previously recognized, that does not mean economics is
useless in analyzing this difficult yet important issue. To the contrary, the
above list of tradeoffs and competing effects should be quite useful to poli-
cymakers, such as legislatures or panels of judges debating the issue.
Perhaps one or another of the competing considerations is more of a policy
priority to policymakers. Moreover, while empirical analysis of the entire
issue is probably unfeasible, policymakers certainly could inform their deci-
sions by undertaking empirical studies of certain key sub-issues: At what
point in litigation do cases currently settle? Is settlement more likely, or
more quickly achieved, in fields of law featuring less uncertainty, such as
breach of contract cases?
Finally, to the extent that economics shows that a confidentiality ban
might be promising or might be harmful, that cloud of uncertainty supports
the idea of local experimentation within our federal system. Specific states
or federal judicial districts could serve as the proverbial "laboratories of
democracy,' ' " undertaking an experiment with banning confidentiality that
could shed light on its effects. A small number of such experiments are un-
derway, but all of them fall far short of a blanket ban on confidentiality.
79
Thus, even if economics cannot provide the holy grail of clear, categori-
cal answers, we need not descend into the nihilism of philosophers who
declare that "one thing is in the least certain-that nothing certain exists.' ' "
Economics can provide policy guidance, but contrary to the traditional view,
it should not be seen as a barrier to the recent proposals to ban or restrict• • 181
confidentiality "-proposals that may be advisable either for non-economic
178. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may
... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.").
179. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
180. 1 PLINY, NATURAL HISTORY bk. 11, para. V, at 185 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1938). Neither do we need to adopt the more disturbing remainder of Pliny's famous quote:
"[Olne thing is in the least certain-that nothing certain exists, and that nothing is more pitiable, or
more presumptuous, than man!" Id.
181. See Zitrin, supra note 10, at 889-97 (discussing proposals at various levels-federal law,
state law, federal judicial district local rules, and ethics authorities such as the American Bar Asso-
ciation-for restricting confidentiality).
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reasons or as a worthwhile reform experiment that economics sees as hold-
ing both great potential and great risk.
